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ABSTRACT 
Innovation in platform industries, including mobile telecommunications, has a great impact on 
societies and economies; hence a migration from an existing platform to the subsequent one should 
be progressed under careful forecasting, weighed scenarios and strategies that encompass a broad 
view. This thesis analyzes why mobile network operators are struggling to move from the second 
generation (2G) and its derivatives to the third generation (3G) technologies and proposes migration 
strategies, which allow them to sustain their competitive advantage. First, a migration model is 
proposed as a reinforcing loop model composed of two dynamics, “Platform Migration” caused by 
a shortage of network capacity, and “Service Innovation” triggered by a decline in ARPU (Average 
Revenue Per User). Platform migration is an implementation process for new platform technologies 
and can be categorized into Revolution-type and Evolution-type. After these two schemes have been 
evaluated through case studies, Collaboration-type migration, an enhanced Evolution-type, is 
proposed for future, technically diversified situations. Service Innovation is a process for creating 
new profitable services to give further revenue growth. Empirical analysis clarifies that mental 
breakthrough management is a common approach in the mobile industry and proposes that a 
mixture of corporate, partner and market initiatives be adopted for diversified customer preference.  
This thesis then proposes the following strategies for future successful migration: first, mobile 
network operators should drive the migration cycle powerfully, concentrating on successive service 
innovation dynamics for their revenue growth and the next platform migration. Second, they should 
choose migration schemes carefully according to their level of technology leadership, value chain 
leadership and investment capability. Finally, service platform should be considered for realization 
of innovative services with Partnership Dynamics. 
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1.  Introduction and Motivation 
 
Deregulation of telecom industry in the 1990s has promoted rapid growth of the market, 
innovations in wireless technologies and restructuring of the value chain. During this 
decade, mobile network operators also experienced a number of migrations1 in technology, 
services, ways of working, etc, resulting from innovations and aimed at providing a better 
communication environment to the customers.  
Failure to handle such migration well causes instability of corporate finance, customer 
churn and loss of opportunities, while successful migration leads to further growth. 
Therefore a successful migration scenario is one of the most important corporate strategies 
for mobile operators2 to sustain their competitive advantages in the marketplace.  
 
1.1. Bitter Trails to the Third Generation Mobile Technologies 
The third generation mobile technologies, called 3G, have been expected to provide a big 
worldwide surge of economic growth after IT bubble burst. However, many mobile 
network operators throughout the world have been struggling to introduce these 
cutting-edge technologies into their networks, although several years have passed since 
specifications became stable in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2000. 
NTT DoCoMo, the Japanese leading mobile operator, launched the world’s first 3G service 
in May 2001. But its trail to success has been hard going on the way. New platform 
                                                   
1 “Migration” is a general word, and not usually used as a synonym for change. However, in this 
research, it is used as a word like change and transition because of its frequent reference in the 
mobile industry. In addition, this migration includes a migration in both technology and business 
structure. 
2 There are some ways to describe the mobile telecommunication network operators: mobile 
carriers, mobile service providers and so on. This research adopts “mobile network operators 
(sometimes mobile operators for the simplification)”, while it adopts “mobile vendors” for 
describing manufacturers in the mobile industry. 
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technologies, which have no backward compatibility with its 2G technologies, force 
DoCoMo to improve service qualities of its network infrastructure and handsets and to 
grope to more attractive services, while those technologies have a much higher 
performance than the previous one. In particular, its decision to downgrade the status from 
a commercial service to an introductory service in the first four months caused much 
disappointment both to the market and to its shareholders. This means that expectations for 
3G from the market had been too high, as can be seen in its stock price fluctuation around 
2001 as shown in Figure 1-1.  
Even now the small coverage and lack of maturity of the handsets prevent DoCoMo from 
seizing the opportunities. In Europe, heavy payouts resulting from 3G license auctions put 
the European mobile network operators in a bad financial situation and have also prevented 
them starting their 3G services. These events illustrate how difficult successful migrations 
can be and how big an impact the failure in such transitions has on the market. 
Figure 1-1 NTT DoCoMo Stock Price Fluctuation 
DoCoMo’s 3G launched
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1.2. Traffic Business is Mainstream  
Migration to the next platform is an unavoidable event for mobile network operators, since 
the evolved platform is essential to acquire further traffic increase and revenue growth. 
Generally it is very clear that the mainstream of telecommunication operators is “Traffic 
Business”. This means that they should pursue not only the expansion of market scale but 
also the innovation of new services that will encourage their customers to use the network 
more frequently. In particular, traffic business in mobile telecommunications is quite 
profitable because mobile terminals have become commodity items in this decade. 
Moreover, portability will lead to various kinds of personal communication that will 
contribute directly to traffic growth. Therefore, mobile network operators continue to 
pursue the traffic business as their mainstream interest, while they are diversifying their 
business models. 
 
Recent trend of using Average Revenue Per Users (ARPU) and Minutes Of Use (MOU) as 
financial criteria of mobile network operators indicates this point clearly. Historically, 
pressure from the market for reductions in call-charges has lead to an increase of MOU and 
to a decline in ARPU. This means that mobile network operators need to extent their 
network capacity efficiently and create further sources of revenue. Therefore, migration to a 
new platform for the efficient accommodation of customers and provide new services 
generating further traffic is inevitable for mobile network operators.  
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1.3. Objective and Overview of the Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to clarify migration mechanisms from the viewpoints of 
business management. Empirical analyses of successful migrations in the past show some 
key factors to be managed in the migration process. And, referring to the analyses, this 
thesis illustrates the current migration problems in 3G and proposes the future migration 
strategies for mobile network operators to sustain their competitive advantage (Thesis 
structure is shown in Figure 1-2). 
 
In Chapter 2, first of all, “Platform Migration” and “Service Innovation” are defined as two 
critical dynamics in mobile migration. During the last decade, the mobile industry has 
experienced several migrations from analog platforms to 3G platforms. Such changes in 
platform technologies are defined as platform migrations. Platform migrations focused on 
relative technology improvements such as higher capacity and enhanced capabilities. 
Another important dynamics is service innovation between two successive platforms. The 
trigger of service innovation is ARPU decline. Mobile network operators are pursuing new 
types of service in order to hold back ARPU decline and stimulate revenue growth. At the 
end of this chapter, it is proposed that the successful migration process should be thought as 
a powerful reinforcing loop led by these two continuous dynamics. 
 
In Chapter 3, empirical analyses of platform migrations in the past reveal capacity shortage 
as one of the critical triggers of migration process and illustrate two migration schemes 
characterized as “Revolution-type” and “Evolution-type”. Additionally, four critical factors 
are introduced for the analysis of these two types, and case studies for Vodafone, NTT 
DoCoMo, SK Telecom and KDDI, which involve the remarkable features of platform 
16 
migration, are examined. At the end of this chapter, I propose a successful model. 
 
In Chapter 4, mechanism of service innovation dynamics is clarified. Specific cases of 
service innovation include the short message service (SMS) and i-mode service. Both 
services arose from innovations after the platforms had been defined. I will extract some 
principles from these two cases and clarify a service innovation model. 
 
In Chapter 5, in order to foresee the future migration, the roadmap to the future mobile 
services is discussed by means of some dynamics. Then, referring to this roadmap analysis, 
Collaboration-type migration, enhanced Evolution-type migration, is proposed as the future 
platform migration scheme. In the rest of this chapter, the current technical performances of 
mobile network operators are measured. This research focuses particularly on R&D 
expenditure and contributions to standardization bodies in making new specifications, 
because standardization activities have been quite important for mobile network operators 
for roaming and interconnectivity.  
 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I will propose a set of strategies are proposed for mobile network 
operators to sustain their competitive advantages in future migration processes. First, 
mobile network operators should drive the migration cycle, concentrating on successive 
service innovations. Next, they should evaluate their current level of technology leadership, 
value chain leadership and investment capability in order to choose the type of its 
appropriate migration from four schemes. In the end, mobile operators should create new 
profitable services on the service platforms with the partnership dynamics. 
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2. Migration in Mobile Telecommunications Industry 
 
2.1. Overviews 
In this chapter, the mechanism of the migration process is clarified from a perspective of 
business management. In the beginning of the chapter, the market and technology trends are 
introduced. Then, considering these tendencies, the migration process is proposed. The 
migration process can be defined as a reinforcing feedback loop composed mainly of two 
powerful dynamics, namely “Platform Migration” and “Service Innovation” These two 
dynamics have their own distinct features and have emerged continuously from the past. In 
introducing these two processes, it is proposed that, from business perspective, the 
migration process should be thought of not in terms of a linear model but of a powerful 
reinforcing model, as explained at the end of this chapter.  
 
2.2. Market Trends 
2.2.1. Market Scale and Penetration 
During this decade, the worldwide mobile market has grown rapidly, and the total number 
of subscribers reached around 1,170 millions3 on Dec. 2002. The several technological and 
service innovations in the mobile industry encourage the customers to use the mobile 
services frequently year by year. But the recent growth of the markets in U.S., Europe and 
Japan becomes slower and shows signs of the saturation, while the worldwide growth will 
keep the current pace for a while. In particular, the penetration ratio in the European market 
reached more than 60% as shown in Figure 2-1. These tendencies indicate mobile operators 
need to not only pursue the market expansion but also explore the new sources of the traffic 
growth. 
                                                   
3 Source: GSM Association (GSMA) Report on Feb.2003 
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Figure 2-1 Number of Subscribers and Penetration in the Mobile Market 
2.2.2. ARPU and MOU 
Recent trend in using Average Revenue Per Users (ARPU) and Minutes Of Use (MOU) as 
the financial criteria in the mobile market illustrates that point clearly. ARPU shows the 
average monthly bill per subscriber. That is, the growth in ARPU directly shows the total 
revenue of mobile network operators, even if the number of users stays constant. ARPU can 
also be used as a measure of current traffic trends (Gruber, 1999). MOU signifies how long 
customers use wireless telephony during a month. This can be used as a measure of traffic 
growth for mobile network operators. The recent trend and the forecast in U.S. ARPU, 
according to UBS Warburg, are shown in Figure 2-2. Fierce competition in the market 
forces mobile operators to reduce the call charges. This behavior can be seen as decline in 
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ARPU (See Appendix 1). Reduction of the call charge encourages the low-end users to 
enter the services. In the end, total revenues from voice service will switch from increasing 
to declining, because of the excessive reduction of call charge and ARPU decline.  
Figure 2-2 Forecast of Voice ARPU and Voice Service Revenues in U.S. Market 
On the other hand, MOU has a contrastive feature to ARPU. A variety of mobile services 
and reduction of call charges will encourage the customers to use the mobile platform so 
frequently. Then, the traffic will increase according to their use as shown in Figure 2-3. 
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Figure 2-3 MOU Increase and ARPU Decline in U.S. Market 
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2.3. Technology Trends 
2.3.1. Mobile Telecom Platform 
Recent diversification in customer preference has led mobile system to be modulized. In 
particular, the success in content services such as i-mode, Japanese mobile Internet access, 
has let the mobile operators to focus on three areas: the technology platform, a new 
business model, and unique content (Gawer and Cusumano, 2000). This means that the 
mobile platform should satisfy common capabilities in response to various requirements, 
while a variety of content will be representative of not only existing mobile services but 
also future mobile applications. Considering this modularization of the mobile industry, I 
propose that the mobile industry structure be composed of several layers, namely Terminal 
layer, Platform layer, Adaptation layer and Service Applications layer as shown in Figure 
2-4.  
Figure 2-4 Mobile Telecom Platform 
In actual network configuration, each layer corresponds to a particular network element as 
shown in Figure 2-5. The platform layer guarantees customers’ connectivity, which is the 
most important role in telecommunication services. 
This study seeks mainly to clarify the innovation and implementation model of this 
platform layer. This layer is just composed of the wireless interface, radio access network 
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(RAN) and core network (CN). Some critical functions such as authentication of customers, 
billing, copyright management and information transfer should also be deployed in this 
layer. The adaptation layer comprises gateway servers or a set of service-oriented 
equipment to ensure connection between the mobile platform and service application 
entities. This layer can be transferred from one platform to the next platform and build up 
flexibly according to each service application. The service applications layer is, in this 
study, considered a group of items of content and service entities. As customer preferences 
become more diversified, the entities in this layer will also increase.  
Figure 2-5 Functional Model of Mobile Service Platform 
2.3.2. Platform Innovations for the Efficient Use of Radio Spectrum 
Mobile technology innovations have emerged in order to improve the network capacity. In 
the respect, enhanced multiple access and voice compression algorithm are critical and 
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wireless interface. Within a service area, mobile network operators want to allow as many 
customers as possible to use their network. They achieve this through multiple access 
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technologies. The significant point about multiplexing is how much spectrum and capacity 
may be allocated to one user efficiently. Generally speaking, if a large bandwidth can be 
deployed for one user, that user can enjoy high-speed transmission. However, mobile 
network operators need to appreciate the trade-off between higher capacity and higher 
transmission speed.  
There are mainly three types of multiple accesses, namely FDMA (Frequency Division 
Multiple Access), TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) and CDMA (Code Division 
Multiple Access) as shown in Figure 2-6. FDMA is a technology that allocates each 
communication channel its own specific frequency. TDMA works by dividing 
communication at one frequency into a number of time slots, each of which corresponds to 
one communication channel (Kuwahara, 1992).  
Figure 2-6 Three Multiple Access Technologies 
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phones and networks are capable of using more advanced compression. 
 
The generations in mobile platform have been concerned closely with these two 
technologies (See Appendix 2). Migration from the first generation mobile systems (1G), 
based on analog-based technologies, to the second generation mobile systems (2G), 
digital-based technologies, emerged mainly for capacity increase to deal with future traffic 
growth. Mixed with TDMA technology, many designs of Compression and Decompression 
(CODEC) have been proposed. The number of communication channels per unit bandwidth 
is one of evaluation criteria of system capacity as shown in Figure 2-7. Personal Digital 
Cellular (PDC), Japanese 2G technologies, adopts two kinds of voice compression 
algorithm, that is full rate (FR) and half rate (HR). PCD-HR realizes a remarkable channel 
efficiency of 0.24 channels per kHz. 
Figure 2-7 Channels per Unit Bandwidth in 1G and 2G Systems 
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2.3.3. Spectrum Allocation 
The more attractive a mobile service is, the more its total traffic will increase. As mentioned 
in Section 2.2.2, Minutes of use (MOU) is increasing year by year, because the call charge 
reduction and the provision of data services match the recent customer preferences.  On 
this point, spectrum allocation is one of the most critical issues for increasing the network 
capacity. Since each frequency band has specific features, mobile network negotiate 
carefully to obtain additional spectrum. With different bands for the same cellular service, 
the system should consider supporting handover and roaming between two frequency bands 
as shown in Figure 2-8.  
 Figure 2-8 Instance of Additional Spectrum for Capacity Increase 
The allocation of spectrum is administered at both national and international levels. 
Basically the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) arranges international 
spectrum allocation for common global technologies such as satellite and mobile services. 
In particular, recent globalization in mobile services has encouraged the ITU to ask 
countries to use the same frequency bands for any new technology. Basically the ITU has 
stated that each country is free to select the spectrum to be used for 3G, because devices for 
roaming services will be simpler to manufacture if they operate at the same frequencies 
worldwide (Dodd, 2001). Therefore many countries, particularly those adopting Universal 
Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS), one of the 3G specifications, are planning to 
use the 2GHz band for their 3G services (Dornan, 2001). 
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2.3.4. Platform Innovations for the Mobile Services 
The other factor for mobile technology innovations is based on the new technologies from 
the aspect of services. Traditional telecom services have been network services such as call 
waiting, call forwarding and voice storage. However the recent diversification in the 
customer preferences forces the mobile operators to pursue new functions for new services 
(Lyytinen and Fomin, 2002). For instances, global roaming and Short Message Service 
(SMS) are key technologies in GSM. In particular, sophisticated roaming function was 
highly required, because the customers moved over the borders and they wanted to use their 
cell phones outside their home country. Furthermore, Nordic Mobile Telecommunications 
(NMT), one of the first generation mobile technologies, was limited to the Nordic area. 
Those factors strongly accelerated the make-up of GSM specifications. In the respect, not 
only the wireless interface but also the core network was designed for these mobile services 
and standardized by regional standardization bodies (Hillebrand, 2002).  
 
As a result of the rapid growth, some regional parties that had developed the digital 
technologies challenged to enhance their platforms for higher data transmission. These 
derivatives, called 2.5G, were mainly based on packet technology, because it was able to 
provide both push and pull environments and also ensure the efficient use of radio interface 
by using the statistical multiplexing effect. In the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI), mobile network operators and vendors proposed sets of specifications and 
finally established the General Packet Radio System (GPRS) in 1999 (Hoffman, 2003). In 
Japan, NTT DoCoMo launched PDC-based Personal Digital Cellular-Packet (PDC-P) 
system in 1997, which would be platform for i-mode service launched in 1999. In United 
States, a packet service called Packet-One was launched commercially in 1999, based on 
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the cdmaOne system, compliant to Interim Standard-95 (IS-95) standardized in American 
National Standard Institute (ANSI).  
 
2.3.5. Third Generation Mobile Technologies (3G) 
Foreseeing the future growth of the mobile market, the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU) investigated global standardization for the third generation mobile 
technologies (3G), called International Mobile Telecommunications 2000 (IMT-2000). ITU 
set the standardization schedule for completing detail specifications by Dec 1999 and 
clarified requirements for the IMT-2000 radio transmission system to provide multimedia 
services in various environments as shown below Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Requirement of the IMT-2000 Radio Transmission Speed 
 Indoor Pedestrian Inside car 
Transmission Speed (kbps) 2048 384 144 
(Source: ITU-R Recommendation) 
In an attempt to establish a unique standardized radio interface, ITU led the study of 
protocols, identifiers, services, voice coding and network architecture, striving to achieve a 
consensus among the number of organizations involved, such as mobile network operators 
and vendors. Nations, regions and organizations were required to propose a radio interfaces, 
and finally several tentative specifications were proposed to ITU, as derivatives of regional 
second generation technologies. Efforts were made simultaneously in some parties such as 
the third generation partnership project (3GPP), and the third generation partnership project 
2 (3GPP2), to build consensus among the competing advocates. In the end, five optional 
interfaces were standardized in May 2000 as shown in Figure 2-9. 
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Figure 2-9 Defined Options for IMT-2000 Radio Interface 
As a result, 3GPP adopted W-CDMA (IMT-2000 CDMA Direct Spread) for its wireless 
interface and radio access network (RAN), and an evolved-GSM core network (CN) as its 
IMT-2000 package, while 3GPP2 accepted CDMA2000 (IMT-2000 CDMA Multicarrier) 
for RAN and an evolved ANSI IS-41 CN as its package as shown in Figure 2-10.  
Figure 2-10 Network Configuration of 3G  
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2.3.6. Migration Paths from 2G to 3G 
As technologies have become more complicated, migration paths in mobile technologies 
have become diversified. Although the aim of standardization is to agree a unique 
specification for global roaming and the reduction of network costs, industry standards are 
difficult to be established. Standards are based on partly the technological investigation and 
partly the result of a political harmonization. Standardization endeavors to maintain a focus 
on the technology, to enter into an industry-wide agreement that reduces time to market and 
ensures product compatibility. However as mentioned above, when technology trends are 
driven by several parties, the direction of standardization becomes complicated. As each 3G 
technology have some compatibility with 2G/2.5G specifications, complex migration paths 
have emerged as shown in  Figure 2-11 (Redman et al, 2002).  
 Figure 2-11 Migration Paths to 3G 
31 
2.4. Migration Process in the Mobile Industry 
2.4.1. Migration Process as Discontinuity 
Many studies have been undertaken in order to classify this kind of technology innovation. 
One study showed four types of innovation process, namely disruption, discontinuity, 
displacement and distraction, called the 4-D classification as shown in Figure 2-12 
(Christensen, Anthony and Roth, 2001).  
Figure 2-12 4D Classification in Telecom Industry 
Based on this classification, migration can be categorized as a discontinuity process. That is, 
this change is a “radically sustaining innovation for better technical performance that either 
meets or exceeds the current needs of the market”. In respect to platform migration, 
incumbents have often applied such innovation. Additionally, migration in the mobile 
industry might have been defined as a technological replacement of the platform. However 
this recognition is not enough from the business perspective. Considering sustainable 
growth of mobile operators, I strongly recommend that migration should be thought as a 
reinforcing feedback loop composed of technology innovation, service innovation and 
investment in the next innovation. This research focuses on illustration of the migration 
mechanism and then proposes successful strategies for mobile network operators.  
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2.4.2. Two Dynamics in Migration Process 
When we consider the migration process, it can be seen that there are two notable dynamics, 
that is, “Platform Migration” and “Service Innovation”. This section suggests that these two 
elements have their own clockspeeds and features.  
Over the last twenty years, the mobile industry has experienced several platform migrations, 
which are well known as the progression of mobile technology generations from 1G to 3G 
(Tachikawa, 2002). Since it is inefficient for mobile network operators to own several 
different types of network system simultaneously, they always move to replace the existing 
platform with the next one. Moreover, from this perspective, the platform migration process 
can also be described as a mixture of two processes of technology implementation and 
customer transfer. Therefore a growth in the number of subscribers is a feature of platform 
migration as shown in  Figure 2-13. 
 Figure 2-13 Growth of Customers in Mobile Platforms 
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On the other hand, we should not overlook the existence of service innovation between 
successive platforms. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the traffic business is mainstream for 
mobile network operators and they should pursue traffic increase. Since platform migration 
by itself does not contribute to traffic growth so well, mobile operators need to create some 
attractive services on the new platform in order to encourage their customers to use the 
network environment more frequently. In addition they should exploit the potential 
performance of the new platform in terms of services. For instances, Short Message Service 
(SMS) in GSM and i-mode service, the Japanese mobile Internet access service, are 
innovative services and bridge across 2G/2.5G and 3G as shown in Figure 2-14.  
Figure 2-14 Combination of Platform and Service Wave in Mobile Migration 
These new services have encouraged the customers to use mobile platform for voice 
telephony, text-based messaging service and content downloading. They lead directly to 
revenue growth as well as traffic growth, even though the operators will be faced with 
pressure from the market for price reductions. In summary, we have to consider that the 
migration process is composed of two processes: platform innovation and service 
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innovation, as shown in Figure 2-15.  
Figure 2-15 Two Dynamics in Mobile Migration 
 
2.4.3. Migration Model in the Mobile Industry 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, this section proposes the migration model should take the 
form of a powerful reinforcing feedback loop as shown in Figure 2-16. This means that, 
while mobile network operators pursue traffic growth and further revenue, they also 
innovate new technologies and services sequentially. Traffic growth arising from new 
services leads to spectrum shortage, just same as a shortage of network capacity. In 
consequence, mobile network operators need to investigate new platform technologies for 
acquiring new spectrum and making efficient use of spectrum that they already owned. This 
is the stimulus for the platform innovation part. 
 
As mentioned previously, platform migration is composed of technology implementation 
and the transfer of customers to the next platform. Simultaneously, mobile operators are 
faced with the pressure of market-driven price reductions. Price reductions also reduce 
ARPU directly. The requirement for recollection of the investment in the previous platform 
migration forces mobile operators to create new services to stimulate traffic growth. Traffic 
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growth leads to capacity shortage, which in turn means spectrum shortage. Occasionally, 
additional spectrum is allocated to mobile network operators when they implement new 
wireless technologies. In addition, mobile network operators have tried to investigate new 
technologies for the efficient use of spectrum and to add some new functions such as global 
mobility, Internet Protocol and so on. These technology innovations encourage mobile 
network operators to migrate their existing platforms to the next ones.  
 
In summary, platform innovations arose due to shortages of capacity, and service 
innovations led by ARPU reduction drive this migration cycle continuously. This is the 
migration mechanism in the mobile communications industry. 
 
Figure 2-16 Migration Dynamics Model in the Mobile Communications Industry 
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2.5. Summary 
In this chapter, the migration model is clarified. The points are the following: 
l The market saturation will confront the European, the US and the Japanese mobile 
operators. The market trends illustrate that their MOU (Minute Of Use) is still 
increasing. But the ARPU (Average Revenue Per User) is declining gradually, because 
of price reduction in the fierce competition. 
l The technical platform, called mobile platform, has been innovated by the two market 
requirements: “efficient use of the radio spectrum” and “additional functions for 
the new mobile services”. The generations in mobile platform have been concerned 
closely with these wireless technology innovations. As the technologies have become 
more complicated, the migration paths, which are transition from the existing 
generation technology to the next one, in mobile technologies have become diversified.  
Referring to these two trends, this chapter clarified the migration process. 
l The migration process in the mobile industry can be defined, according to 4-D 
classification scheme by Christensen et al., as discontinuity event, managed by 
incumbent companies such as mobile network operators.  
l The migration model is a reinforcing feedback model, rotated powerfully by two 
dynamics: “Platform Migration” caused by a shortage of network capacity, and 
“Service Innovation” triggered by a decline in ARPU (Average Revenue Per User).  
 
In Chapter 3, platform migration dynamics is analyzed and defined more clearly from case 
studies. Service innovation dynamics will be also clarified in Chapter 4 with proposed 
analytical framework. 
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3. Platform Migration Dynamics 
 
3.1. Overviews 
The key issue in this chapter is to clarify the mechanisms of platform migration dynamics. 
Firstly, the empirical analysis about platform migrations in the past indicates consistent 
triggers, namely capacity shortage and function enhancement. Next, two kinds of migration 
scheme, known as the Revolution-type and the Evolution-type, are explained. Additionally, 
an analytical framework of 4C (Capability, Coverage, Cost and Complementary Assets) is 
proposed and applied to four specific cases relating to Vodafone, NTT DoCoMo, SK 
Telecom and KDDI. Referring to these case studies, three key factors, namely technology 
leadership, value chain leadership and investment capability, are illustrated as criteria to 
entry platform migration process.  
 
3.2. Triggers in Platform Migration Dynamics 
Platform migration means the replacement of an existing network system with the next 
generation and the transfer of customers to the next platform. There are two consistent 
triggers for platform migration as shown in Figure 3-1. One is capacity increase, to cater for 
traffic growth, and the other is deployment of new network functions, to support future new 
services. Historically an increase in capacity is more important than new function 
deployment, because radio frequencies are a limited resource. In this case, capacity means 
network capacity, which is how many customers can transfer information simultaneously. 
Capacity shortage is also quite a severe problem for mobile network operators, because the 
capacity determines the actual market share. Additionally operators have to stop their sales 
of handsets, if they are faced with a capacity shortage. In Table 3-1, historical causes of 
traffic growth leading to platform migrations are shown.  
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Table 3-1 Cause of Traffic Growth for Platform Migration 
Platform Migration Cause of Traffic Growth Innovative Services 
1G to 2G Voice Telephony Cell Phone Service 
2G/2.5G to 3G Small Data Traffic SMS, i-mode 
3G to B3G Rich data content MMS, Moving Picture 
 
For the migration from 1G to 2G, voice telephony was the main mobile service and traffic 
increased with market growth. After this, data services have been the triggers to accelerate 
platform migration from 2G to 2.5G and from 2.5G to 3G.  
The other trigger for platform migration is the deployment of new functions. That is, the 
anticipation of new services requires new functions in the mobile infrastructure. As 
mentioned in Section 2.3.4, the global roaming function was one of the triggers for 
establishment of GSM specifications. 
Figure 3-1 Triggers of Platform Migration 
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3.3. Platform Migration Model 
3.3.1. Backward Compatibility 
This section categorizes the past migrations into two types, namely the Revolution-type and 
the Evolution-type, from an empirical analysis. Compatibility between the existing platform 
and the next platform is a critical factor as shown in Figure 3-2.  
In this analysis, backward-compatibility means that legacies of existing network equipment 
can be used in the next platform. In addition, wireless interface compatibility, meaning the 
same as handset compatibility, is also important. That is, handsets for the next platform can 
be used for common services such as voice telephony or date transmission for existing 
services in the existing platform. Therefore, following cases are not backward compatible: 
PDC with GSM, GSM with AMPS and PDC with IMT-2000. If mobile operators are able to 
provide dual-mode or tri-mode handsets that support these different wireless interfaces, 
their customers will be able to enjoy the same environment as the backward compatibility.  
Figure 3-2 Backward Compatibility in Two Migration Schemes 
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3.3.2. Revolution-type Platform Migration 
Revolution-type migration occurs when the existing and new platforms have no 
compatibility, as shown in Figure 3-3. For instance, the latest case is the migration path 
from PDC to IMT-2000 DS-CDMA in the Japanese market. Study group of 3GPP proposed 
that the wireless interface of IMT-2000/UMTS would be W-CDMA and core network (CN) 
would be an evolved GSM Network. Enhanced GSM CN and PDC CN are almost entirely 
different, from network architecture to protocol. This means that neither the wireless 
interface nor the core network have any compatibility. Another case is from CDMA2000 1x 
to IMT-2000 DS-CDMA in the near future in Korea (Song, 2002).  
Figure 3-3 Revolution-type and Evolution-type 
3.3.3. Evolution-type Platform Migration 
This type of migration allows operators to transfer legacy network resources to the next 
platform. Examples of Evolution-type migration paths are the natural paths from GSM to 
GPRS/UMTS, from PDC to PDC-P and from cdmaOne to CDMA2000 1x. In particular, 
the cdmaOne and CDMA2000 series are specifications strategically developed by 
Qualcomm. Mobile network operators owning CDMA2000 have only to install new 
channel cards in the base station equipment, software upgrades at the base station controller 
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and mobile switching center, and a packet core backbone to carry traffic. Infrastructure 
costs are clearly lower than with the Revolution-type and the speed of implementation and 
coverage expansion are also faster.  
Table 3-2 Features and Instances of two Migration Schemes 
Revolution-type Evolution-type 
Newly Implemented 
Required Standardization 
Partially Used Network Legacies 
Including Normal Upgrade 
(Including software upgrade) 
Backward Compatibility 
NMT (1G) to GSM (2G) 
TACS (1G) to GSM (2G) 
PDC (2G) to cdmaOne (2G) 
PDC (2G) to IMT-2000/UMTS (3G) 
GSM (2G) to GPRS (2.5G) to UMTS (3G) 
PDC (2G) to PDC-P (2.5G) 
cdmaOne (2G) to CDMA2000 1x (2.5G) 
CDMA2000 1x (2G) to CDMA2000 EVDO (3G) 
 
The technical features in Evolution-type migration can be described as the up-grade of 
hardware and software, in terms of using various items of legacy network equipment and 
terminals. For instances, GPRS, 2.5G follow-on GSM, allows mobile network operators to 
use many items of legacies of GSM network equipment as shown in Figure 3-4 
Figure 3-4 Upgrade from GSM platform to GPRS platform 
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3.3.4. Platform Migration Model 
These two schemes are not mutually exclusive, as is demonstrated in Figure 3-5. However 
external and internal strategic requirements are dominant factors for mobile network 
operators in deciding which scheme will be applied. In particular, the development process 
and government policies are critical factors. A Rough analysis shows that Evolution-type 
migration is easier to be constructed than Revolution-type, but occasionally pressures from 
outside may not allow mobile network operators to choose the Evolution-type. In any case, 
mobile network operators need to demonstrate leadership for their own success in these 
migrations. Therefore, corporate decisions and preparation planning from a long-term view 
are quite important. 
 Figure 3-5 Platform Migration Model 
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3.4. 4C Framework for Platform Migration 
For analyzing these two schemes, four analytical factors, which help to clarify the features 
of these two migration schemes, are proposed. Then, the fundamental implementation 
model is clarified in the rest of this section. After the advantages of Evolution-type 
migration have been shown, a set of tactics and strategies for successful migration in the 
future are suggested. In particular, that is how to drive Revolution-type successfully. 
 
3.4.1. 4C Factors for Platform Migration 
Some research studies have shown the users re-select their mobile network operators in 
terms of coverage, cost, capacity, capability and clarity (Skvaria, 2002). Historically, these 
factors are quite critical for mobile voice telephony. Considering the past migrations of 
mobile platform, I have rearranged these and now propose four elements as critical factors 
for the migration process, namely, capability, coverage, cost, and complementary assets as 
shown in Figure 3-6.  
Figure 3-6 4C as Critical Factors in Platform Migration  
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3.4.2. Capability 
Capability is one of the fundamental factors for migration. Basically, one of the critical 
capabilities is transmission speed over the radio interfaces. That is different from wired 
interfaces, since it is limited by the cell size and features of bandwidth allocated to the 
mobile services. Another critical capability is the capacity for managing calls occurring at 
the same time. Those are just trade-off with transmission capacity allocated to each call. 
Therefore, the innovations in the wireless interface have been focused on higher 
transmission speeds and efficient use of radio bandwidth in order to achieve a larger 
capacity. Moreover, aspects of terminal performances such as battery life and usability are 
counted as capability. 
 
3.4.3. Coverage 
Connectivity to network is very important for customers, because, if they are out of service 
area or in a black spot, they really experience inconvenience and may switch to a different 
mobile network operator. Since preparing for perfect coverage in the planning phase of a 
new platform is a major task, because of its network cost, mobile network operators need to 
build their scenarios of service area expansion carefully with regard to market requirements. 
Additionally, indoor coverage is becoming more important for customers in a statistical 
wireless environment. Cell phone are used as wireless connection tools such as wireless 
modem, mainly in an indoor environment. 
 
3.4.4. Cost 
Cost means how much customers need to spend for mobile service. It is composed of two 
factors, namely the initial cost of the handsets and the call charge. These factors are 
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basically dependent on the productivity of supplier suppliers and mobile operators’ network 
designs. Operators apply a strategic pricing structure for successful migration. A 
commission fee paid to their distributors is one of the means of strategic price-reduction of 
handsets. Distributors can use this commission fee as the source of price reduction of 
terminal. In addition, pricing strategies need to be commensurate with coverage. That 
means small coverage in the beginning of the platform migration causes a bad publicity and 
reduces the brand-power of the new services. Therefore to heighten the initial costs in 
strategic pricing have a role in the barriers to prevent customers from transferring to the 
next platform in the first step.  
 
3.4.5. Complementary Assets 
Generally the profits from innovation may accrue to the owners of certain complementary 
assets around core platform. This means that the innovating company needs to establish a 
prior position in these complementary assets for further growth (Teece, 1986). Mobile 
platform has also several critical complementary assets in order to capture value of the 
service. In this framework, this concept is referred as anything relating to content and its 
delivery to a terminal, because these are influential factors for mobile services. After 
launching a mobile Internet access service, the available content adds value to the platform 
technologies, while the terminal is the essential user interface for delivering the content to 
customers. In particular, the availability of terminals on the market is quite important. For 
instance, in the case of the migration to GPRS, the delayed release of terminals to the 
marketplace resulted in a negative impact on the sustained growth of the European mobile 
market (Hoffman, 2003). 
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3.5. Case Analysis of Revolution-type Migration 
This section and the next section analyze some case histories, which illustrate 
Revolution-type and Evolution-type migration, in order to clarify their features. For 
Revolution-type migration, Vodafone GSM and NTT DoCoMo PDC are shown. These two 
companies constructed their different digital systems relatively early compared with the rest 
of the world and spent several years bringing them to the maturity. Their management of 
these two cases gives us some implications of how mobile network operators may exercise 
care in driving Revolution-type migration. 
 
The other cases relate to Evolution-type migration. Mobile operators, which owned 
cdmaOne platform, began to migrate their platforms to CDMA2000 1x. This is the reason 
why the quality of CDMA2000 1x has become stable in the last few years, and why fierce 
competition has emerged even in high-speed data services. SK Telecom, the first 
implementer of CDMA2000 1x in the world, is shown as first case study. The second 
Evolution-type case is that of KDDI, the second largest Japanese operators, which is 
presenting a challenge to DoCoMo’s 3G services by using CDMA2000 1x.  
 
3.5.1. Overviews 
As shown above, several Revolution-type migrations have already occurred in the mobile 
industry. Migration from 1G (Analog) to 2G (Digital) is a remarkable case of 
Revolution-type, because this is the first migration, which mobile network operators were 
faced with. Also, there was no compatibility between these two technologies. As a result, 
this migration may exaggerate not only the features of Revolution-type migration but also 
the problems that mobile network operators currently suffer from in 3G migrations. 
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In the early 1980s, foreseeing the future growth of mobile service, many operators started 
to investigate specifications for a new platform. Certain market requirements such as higher 
capacity, security and global mobility had indicated the choice of digital technology as 
wireless interface. Key technologies are compressed voice coding, to reduce the data 
volume and TDMA technologies for the efficient use of bandwidth, while an additional 
requirement was roaming for mobility beyond the boundary of an operator. In ITU, three 
de-juré specifications were adopted as digital cellular technologies as shown in Table 3-3. 
Once these specifications were stable, mobile network operators were faced with the first 
platform migration, from the analog mobile platform to the digital mobile platform.  
This section shows these first migration cases in the world. The first one is the platform 
migration of Vodafone, from TACS to GSM, and the second is that of NTT DoCoMo, 
moving from NTT-Analog System to PDC.  
Table 3-3 Three Specifications for the 2G Wireless Interface 
Specifications Speech Coding Channel per kHz 
Europe GSM 22.8kb/s PRE-LTP-LPC 0.04 
PDC (Japan) 11.2kb/s VSELP 
5.6kb/s PSI-CELP 
0.12 
0.24 
North America IS-54 13kb/s VSELP 0.1 
 
3.5.2. Case of Vodafone 
Vodafone PLC, currently the largest mobile operator in the world, obtained a license for 
cellular telephone networks from UK Government in 1983. Before that, one other license 
had been awarded to Cellnet, a company owned by British Telecom and Securicor 
Communications Limited, currently known as mmO2 PLC. In 1985, representatives of 
state-owned telecom operators in France, Germany and Italy agreed to establish and 
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promote a series of interlinked, compatible, digital cellular telephone networks, which 
could constitute a pan-European system and be used by subscribers throughout Europe. 
Vodafone and Cellnet became parties to this agreement in 1986. Vodafone’s next generation 
platform was designed to form part of the UK element of this pan-European system and 
follows the GSM specification (Stuart and Bhalla 2002).  
In December 1991, Vodafone introduced its digital network in Central London. However in 
first three years it struggled to grab customers’ interest because of smaller coverage and 
lower stability than the analog platform. As can be seen by reference to its customer growth 
shown in Figure 3-7, we can see that around 1997 was the turning point for Vodafone’s 
digital service. The more detail analyses in terms of 4C framework are shown below. 
 
Capability of connectivity: After facing the challenge to improve quality of its digital 
cellular service, its call completion success rate reached around 92%, which was about the 
same level as its analog service, which had a 91% call completion success rate in 1997. 
Coverage Expansion: As shown in Figure 3-7, in 1994, the coverage of the digital service 
was around 70% of the population. Vodafone accelerated its building of base stations, and 
by the end of March 1997, there were 2,813 digital base stations in service in the UK, 
giving a declared coverage of over 95% of the population.  
Cost: Vodafone introduced new digital tariffs such as “BusinessWorld” for corporate users 
and “PersonalWorld” for the low-use consumer in 1996, which offered per second billing, 
“bundled” free minutes and competitive call rates. These pricing structures were a 
significant factor underlying the level of net growth in customers connected to the digital 
services. In 1998, Vodafone introduced pre-paid services in digital cellular services.  
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Complementary assets: Unlike the more recent mobile Internet service, second-generation 
content of second-generation services were restricted to voice and low speed data services 
such as Short Message Service (SMS). In 1994, Nokia released its 2100 series supporting 
the SMS function. This new, smaller phone with SMS appealed to customers. Another 
notable point was that in 1997, Mr. Chris Gent, the new CEO of Vodafone, aggressively 
united the six cellular providers it had acquired (Vodac, Talkland, Vodacom, Voadcall, Astec, 
and People’s Phone) under the Vodafone brand.  
Figure 3-7 Customer Growth and Coverage Expansion in Vodafone GSM 
3.5.3. Case of NTT DoCoMo 
In Japan, to cater for further growth in the mobile market, studies on the technical 
requirements for digital cellular technologies began at the request of Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications. The studies crystallized in the form of a recommendation to adopt 
TDMA in 1990. In parallel, Research and Development Center for Radio System (RCR) 
Source: Vodafone Annual Report and Form 20-F
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studied the radio interface specifications in detail, leading to the establishment of a digital 
car phone system standard called Personal Digital Cellular telecommunication system 
(PDC) (Tachikawa, 2002)  
NTT DoCoMo Inc. was spun off from Nippon Telegraph and Telecom Inc. (NTT) in 1992. 
It took over a large R&D sector focusing on mobile services from NTT for progressing 
mobile technologies. The R&D arm of DoCoMo contributed many specifications for PDC. 
Then, after the specifications were frozen, DoCoMo developed its network equipment, base 
stations, and handsets in conjunction with several Japanese vendors. In 1993, DoCoMo 
launched its digital cellular services in the center of Tokyo area and expanded its digital 
cellular platform year by year. As shown by its customer growth in Figure 3-8, the turning 
point was around 1996. The more detail analyses in terms of 4C framework are shown 
below. 
 
Capability: Consistent responses to challenges by its R&D department and Communication 
Technology System department improved the quality of service year by year. A remarkable 
improvement around 1996 was the release of the “HYPER” series of terminals, with longer 
battery life and smaller body size. As the R&D arm of DoCoMo developed and improved 
handsets almost every year, this “HYPER” achieved a weight of only 125g, half that of an 
analog terminal, and a successive talking time 250 minutes, twice that of an analog one. 
Coverage Expansion: As shown in Figure 3-8, during the first few years its service 
coverage was under 90%. However, once it exceeded 95% in 1996, the number of 
customers grew rapidly. 
Cost: DoCoMo improved its tariff structure with constantly reduction of telephone charge 
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from 1995 to 1996. For instance, they abandoned contract fee in 1996. 
Complementary assets: Through its close relationship with terminal vendors in the 
development process, DoCoMo improved its digital handsets and distributed a new series 
every year. Unlike the European market, DoCoMo purchased the handsets and sold them 
through their franchised DoCoMo-shops timely. Combined with its strong brand image in 
its analog service, this distribution structure can be thought of as one of its critical 
complementary assets.  
Figure 3-8 Customer Growth and Coverage Expansion in DoCoMo PDC 
 
3.5.4. Lesson from Revolution-type cases 
From the examination of the migration challenges of Vodafone and DoCoMo, we can see 
some common feature of migration as shown in Table 3-4. Vodafone took 6 years to double 
the progress of its digital services, while DoCoMo took 3 years. 
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Table 3-4 Analysis of cases of Vodafone and NTT DoCoMo 
Company 
(Launch) 
Turning 
point 
Capability Coverage 
In Turning point 
Cost Complementary 
Assets 
Vodafone 
(1991) 
1997 Call Access 
Rate92%(91%) 
95% Bundle in 
1996 
SMS 
NTT DoCoMo 
(1993) 
1996 Down sized 
Longer Battery 
95% New tariff 
in 1996 
Smaller MS 
Distribution 
 
Firstly, it can be seen that mobile network operators will take several years for market 
expansion using Revolution-type platform migration. I assume that mobile network 
operators took some periods for feedback to improve their quality of capability and 
coverage. Secondly, customers did not move to 2G platforms until the coverage was 
nationwide and the capability was adequate, even though the first segment of the market 
targeted was business or corporate use. Therefore mobile network operators should enhance 
the quality of coverage and capability with a higher priority than for other factors. Then 
they can encourage customers to move by means of price reductions. This means that there 
are two steps for successful platform migration. The first step focused on coverage 
completeness and quality improvement. The next step is promotion in terms of price 
reductions and renewal of the brand. Just considering those points, we would like to extract 
some requirements for successful Revolution-type migration. 
 
Faster Implementation: From a financial viewpoint, it is not a good strategy for telecom 
operators to support different kinds of platform simultaneously for a long time, because 
they have to spend their resources on maintaining and operating them. In particular, the 
next generation mobile platform can take over the services of immediately previous 
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platform. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that mobile network operators should 
invest in building a new platform, improve the quality of services, lower the cost barriers 
and manage the distribution of complementary assets as soon as they can. 
 
Technology Leadership: One of the remarkable differences between the two cases is 
technology leadership in development process. DoCoMo led technical investigations in 
developing PDC and holds some of the essential intellectual property right (EIPR). Its 
technical capabilities allowed DoCoMo to investigate faults in its coming platform’s 
performance. Moreover, it enabled DoCoMo to modify some specifications for 
enhancement by itself, even though the operator had no internal manufacturing process. 
 
Integration of Value Chain: Another reason why DoCoMo was able to achieve successful 
migration in such a shorter period than Vodafone is that it had both leadership of terminal 
development and its own distribution channels. Unlike mobile network operators in other 
countries, Japanese mobile network operators have their own distribution channels and sell 
handsets as their own products. This logistics enables Japanese mobile operators to keep 
their bargaining power to the handsets suppliers. As mentioned in Section 3.5.3, DoCoMo 
was able to distribute its new handsets, supporting the latest network services, on time, 
even though they held the risk of responsibilities for inventories.  
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3.6. Cases Analysis of Evolution-type Migration 
3.6.1. Overviews 
In this section, CDMA2000 migration is discussed mainly, because its migration path is the 
Evolution-type scheme proposed strategically by Qualcomm. And it exhibits close 
backward compatibility with cdmaOne also designed by Qualcomm. As mentioned in 
Section 2.3.6, mobile network operators choosing this cdmaOne migration path can enjoy 
its easier migration. Both SK Telecom and KDDI are in this situation. 
 
3.6.2. Case of SK Telecom 
SK Telecom, the leading mobile operator in the Korean market, was established in March 
1984 under the name of Korea Mobile Telecommunications Co., Ltd (KMT), under the 
laws of the Republic of Korea. It changed its name to SK Telecom in March 1997, and 
became a member of SK Group (Song, 2002).  
SK Telecom experienced Revolution-type migration from analog to cdmaOne as its digital 
service in 1996. This was the first implementation of cdmaOne in the world. Actually SK 
Telecom faced a severe capacity shortage in catering for customer growth, since it could not 
be given additional spectrum. This capacity problem was a strong influence on SK Telecom 
in facing the challenge of fast migration. SK Telecom has a well-organized R&D arm, 
which showed organized process management for its implementation, and successfully 
completed this Revolution-type migration in only three years.  
After maturity was reached for digital services in the Korean market, competition with KT 
Freetel and LG Telecom became fiercer. In order to sustain its advantage, SK Telecom 
decided to migrate its platform from cdmaOne to CDMA2000 1x, which was also the 
world’s first launch in October 2000. In 2002, SK Telecom merged Shinsegi Telecom 
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completely. Shinsegi Telecom had provided a cell phone service in terms of the 800MHz 
band, the same frequency band as SK Telecom. Then this merger allowed SK Telecom to 
gain both additional spectrum in the 800MHz band and the 3.5 million subscribers of 
Shinsegi. The more detail analyses in terms of 4C framework are shown below. 
 
Capability: CDMA2000 1x can provide 144kbps data service to customers, and content can 
be downloaded more smoothly than is possible with cdmaOne handsets. Additionally, since 
SK Telecom merged with Shinsegi Telecom in 2002, it was able to take over the spectrum 
of Shinsegi Telecom at 800MHz as additional spectrum for CDMA2000 1x. 
Coverage: CDMA2000 1x was launched with backward compatibility and its evolution 
scheme of migration allowed its coverage to reach more than 90% for only one year as 
shown in Figure 3-9.  
Cost: Most Subscribers who switched over to CDMA2000 1x handsets do not care too 
much about the technology. SK Telecom kept the price of CDMA2000 1x handsets almost 
the same as that of cdmaOne. 
Complementary Assets: SK Telecom has a close relationship with a number of content 
providers like NTT DoCoMo i-mode. This content line-up was transferred seamlessly to 
CDMA2000 1x. In addition, SK Telecom released a CDMA2000 1x handset with a 
color-display. Considering the fact that users using new handsets with color-display and 
polyphonic sounds generate higher ARPU compared to users with normal phones, these 
newly equipped handsets have encouraged customer transfer4. SK Telecom has a very 
strong branding power and successfully provided differentiated services to various market 
                                                   
4 Gartner Operational Management Research, Jan. 2003 
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segments. In particular, “011”, the first three digits of its subscriber number range, is one of 
its strong brand images. 
Figure 3-9 Customer Growth and Coverage Expansion in SK Telecom  
3.6.3. Case of KDDI 
In the Japanese mobile market, KDDI, the second largest mobile operator, had already 
implemented cdmaOne to their network in 1998 and faced the challenge of Evolution-type 
migration from cdmaOne to CDMA2000 1x in 2002.  
KDDI Corporation was established in June 1984 as Daini-Den Den Planning Company, 
changing its name to DDI Corporation in April 1985. In October 2000, DDI Corporation 
merged with KDD Corporation and IDO Corporation to from the new DDI Corporation. (In 
April 2001, the company changed its name officially to KDDI Corporation.) In this merger, 
KDDI set two brands as their cell phone services. One is “Tu-ka”, which focuses on PDC 
service in the 1.5GHz band, and the other is “au” for cdmaOne service in the 800MHz band. 
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Actually, IDO and DDI had already completed their cdmaOne platform nationwide by 2000, 
because powerful pressures from its competitors such as NTT DoCoMo and J-phone, the 
third mobile operators and currently a subsidiary of Vodafone, forced them to accelerate 
expansion of its service coverage. The more detail analyses in terms of 4C framework are 
shown below. 
 
Capability: Compared to DoCoMo’s PDC handsets, even the cdmaOne handsets of au had a 
shorter average battery life for standby time than those of DoCoMo. However fortunately 
the technology maturity of CDMA2000 1x ensured that the same capability could be 
retained as cdmaOne. This meant they did not have any disadvantage in the market place 
over battery life. On the other hand, CDMA2000 1x can provide 144kbps data service to 
customers and content can be downloaded more smoothly than with cdmaOne handsets. 
Coverage: CDMA2000 1x was launched with backward compatibility and an evolution 
scheme of migration allowed its coverage to reach more than 90% in only one year as 
shown in Figure 3-10. Therefore the users hardly perceived that CDMA2000 1x coverage 
was limited. 
Cost: KDDI set the street price of CDMA2000 1x handsets as almost the same as that of 
cdmaOne, and did not give a special service name to it at the beginning. That is, KDDI 
categorized CDMA2000 1x handsets as one of “cdmaOne Series.” Meanwhile au stopped 
introducing new models for cdmaOne terminal after it launched CDMA2000 1x in April 
2002. Then its customers naturally concentrated on CDMA2000 1x models when they 
upgraded their handsets at regular periods. Therefore au did not have to set additional 
budget for customer transfer. Another point is about reduction of call charge. Regardless of 
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this CDMA2000 service, KDDI introduced “Gakuwari”, Japan’s first discount mobile 
service plan for students in November 2000. This new pricing attracted the Japanese 
younger generation to the au mobile services. 
Complementary Assets: KDDI has provides its own mobile Internet access service, branded 
“EZ web”. This service has similar the business model with a number of content providers 
like DoCoMo i-mode. In platform migration to CDMA2000 1x, KDDI was able to transfer 
its content line-up seamlessly to the new platform like SK Telecom.  
 
The other issue in the KDDI’s platform migration strategies is about its spectrum allocation. 
au first introduced first CDMA2000 1x with a focus initially on a system operating in the 
800MHz band. This enabled au to use the existing cdmaOne infrastructure and therefore 
maximize financial efficiency. 
Figure 3-10 Customer Growth and Coverage Expansion in au CDMA2000 1x 
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Furthermore, au have planed to launch 2GHz CDMA2000 1x and 800MHz CDMA2000 1x 
EV-DO between fiscal 2002 and fiscal 2003. That is, it will use its 2GHx bandwidth 
allocation for 3G to provide future increase in capacity of 800MHz CDMA2000 1x, and 
simultaneously implement CDMA2000 1x EV-DO, the next phase of CDMA2000 series, 
using their 800MHz network resource as shown in Figure 3-11. 
Figure 3-11 KDDI Spectrum Usage 
 
3.6.4. Lesson from Evolution-type Case 
It is very clear that Evolution-type migration is more advantageous for mobile network 
operators than Revolution-type. The noteworthy features of Evolution-type migration are 
summarized below. 
 
Backward Compatibility: This function is quite strong. Mobile network operators can time 
the release of their new handsets for customers’ upgrades. This continuity prevents 
customer churn. SK Telecom states that its churn rate is around 1%, while NTT DoCoMo 
has 3.6 % of DoCoMo in March 2002 and KDDI au has 1.8% at the same time.  
The other issue is that that, in the KDDI case, cdmaOne and CDMA2000 1x had already 
been installed in Korea and the United States. Therefore, KDDI did not have to pay 
Tu-ka
au
800MHz
band
KDDI
CDMA2000 1x2GHz
band
PDC1.5GHz
band
cdmaOne CDMA2000 1x
Fiscal 2002 Fiscal 2003
CDMA2000 1x EV-DO
Capacity Increase
PDC
60 
attention to improving the quality of software and hardware, tuning-up the network 
equipment, and network design. We should also recognize that these two companies had 
previously invested a significant amount of capital to migrate from analog or PDC to 
cdmaOne. Finally, we have to recognize the fact that Qualcomm had developed both the 
cdmaOne and CDMA2000 series. This meant that SK Telecom and KDDI did not have to 
propose anything in the investigation phase. Not taking a strong position in driving 
development investigation and standardization, it should be noted that these two companies 
focused on the operation of their platform implementation. 
 
Much Faster Expansion of Coverage: Evolution-type migration can use the legacy network 
elements of the previous platform. As a result, it enables a mobile network operator not 
only to replace its platform much faster but also to expand its coverage with lower network 
cost than Revolution-type. 
 
Transfer of Complementary Assets: These two cases clearly illustrate that killer applications 
are not dominant factors in platform migration, because customers of SK Telecom and 
KDDI were not conscious of the implementation of the new platform technologies. Both 
these two companies delivered new handsets supporting CDMA2000 1x as the normal 
product and eventually ceased providing those for cdmaOne. It is not denied that new 
attractive applications will accelerate customer transfer, but the most important point is to 
transfer the existing complementary assets, for example ensuring that a set of content 
should be transferred completely. A reduced line-up of services or content makes customers 
disappointed and prevents them from transferring. 
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3.7. Recommendations for Successful Platform Migration 
3.7.1. Evaluation Criteria for Entry in Platform Migration 
Two kinds of platform migration process have been introduced. It is much easier for mobile 
operators to drive the Evolution-type migration than the Revolution-type. 
As mobile technologies become more complicated, it will be more difficult to harmonize a 
unique standardized specification from now on. In particular, since the large market scale 
has given attractiveness to operators and vendors, several standardization groups will 
propose many wireless specifications based on their own investigation in the future. 
Therefore, it will also be much harder for mobile network operators not only to choose the 
appropriate technologies but also to migrate at financially reasonable intervals.  
 
Considering such uncertainties, mobile network operators should prepare some strategies 
for successful future platform migration. Based on these lessons, the first recommendation 
is that mobile network operators should arrange their migration path to be of the 
Evolution-type. In Evolution-type migration, they can retain their market power and 
upgrade their platform performance smoothly without incurring churn. In this section, three 
criteria, namely technology leadership, value chain leadership and investment capability are 
proposed for evaluation of the operators capability to drive platform migration successfully 
as shown in Figure 3-12.  
 
Next, in situations where mobile network operators have to choose Revolution-type 
migration, they should build their migration scenario quite carefully. They should consider 
the four factors of coverage, capability, cost and complementary assets, in order to avoid 
the bitter trail, which can accompany Revolution-type migration to the next platform. 
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Figure 3-12 Three Evaluation Criteria for Entry to Platform Migration 
3.7.2. Technology Leadership 
Platform migration is a kind of technology innovation. For successful implementation and 
launch of the platform on time, mobile network operators have to show their technology 
leadership. From the case analyses, there are two necessary competencies for mobile 
operators. One is the capability to assess technology investment, such as an R&D arm, and 
the second is process management for outsourcing and testing the new platform. 
In respect of R&D arms, there are some problems for mobile network operators. As mobile 
technologies have become globalized, the development stage and manufacturing processes 
have become more complicated. Some of vendors, Nokia, Ericsson, Motorola, Alcatel, 
Siemens and recently Qualcomm own R&D resources all over the world, and they have led 
technology trends in the telecom industry. Historically Public Telecommunication and 
Telegraph groups also have their own R&D sectors and have led technical investigations in 
the telecom industry (Lehenkari and Miettinen, 2002). Government policies in the 1990s, 
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however, had a great impact on the industrial structure, and reduced the competitive power 
of mobile network operators in technology innovation5. It can be said that an R&D facility 
is essential for mobile network operators if they are to take initiatives in future mobile 
technology trends and finally active leadership in the migration process. Another important 
point is process management. Historically, mobile operators have outsourced the 
manufacturing process to telecom vendors. This means that the progress of manufacture 
and quality improvement is hidden from operators. As mobile technologies become more 
complicated, even vendors may not be able to guarantee to release a set of equipment to 
operators. For instance, this matter caused a delay in the schedule of GPRS launch in 2000 
and same situation can be seen in DoCoMo’s 3G launch. Therefore, mobile operators 
should adopt a strategy of working with multiple vendors and build internal capabilities for 
the process management of their platform implementation. 
 
3.7.3. Leadership in Value Chain Dynamics 
Successful migration can be defined as the transfer to new technology in the way the 
mobile network operators planed. This does not only apply to network equipment; in 
addition, a set of content and terminal handsets should be prepared and released to the 
marketplace in a form which appeals to customers and grabs their attention. This means 
mobile network operators should encourage these kinds of suppliers to provide their 
products and should build close relationships with them. The horizontal and vertical 
integration in the value chain are quite important in encouraging these suppliers. This 
aspect of integration has a direct impact on relationships with partners, and so influences 
                                                   
5 Referring to Section 5.2.4 
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the development of complementary assets.  
 
3.7.4. Investment Capability 
For faster migration to next technologies, mobile network operators should invest their 
capital in installing the required number of base stations, in core network equipment and 
software. Therefore a higher investment capability will directly influence the expansion of 
coverage, one of the critical factors to be solved in the first step. In addition, higher 
investment capability will enable mobile network operators to adopt strategic pricing 
policies such as offering a commission fee to reduce the initial cost, in order to accelerate 
customer transfer to the new platform. Investment capability is dependent on revenue from 
the existing services. It is natural that they can raise money from the outside. However it is 
a little bit risky, because there is no guarantee that the new platform will enable them to 
recoup without new profitable service. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, since migration process is a reinforcing feedback loop, mobile 
network operators should always investigate new services and business models as a source 
of further revenue. The concept of service innovation in mobile operators is based on this 
principle. Additionally, recent spectrum auctions have forced mobile network operators to 
spend huge amount of money to acquire new bandwidth and licenses. Because of this, it is 
the more important for mobile operators to sustain their investment capability for further 
growth.   
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3.8. Tactical Operation from Empirical Analysis 
3.8.1. Recommended Process for Revolution-type Migration 
With reference to the above recommendation, the appropriate approach to Revolution-type 
migration is proposed as shown in Figure 3-13.  
This process can be divided into two steps. The first step is just focused on quality 
improvement and the expansion of coverage as mentioned in Section 3.5.4. In this step, 
mobile network operators concentrate on improvement in platform performance. They 
should also transfer complete sets of complementary assets on the existing platform. 
Figure 3-13 Recommended Approach to Revolution-type Migration 
After listening to their customers’ reaction, mobile network operators move to next step. In 
this step, they can change the call charges and initial cost for fitting customer preference. 
This phase will lead to a turning point in customer transfer. Mobile network operators 
should then start to investigate and invest in the service innovation process. 
This means that complementary assets are not dominant factors in the first step of platform 
migration; customer requirements are more fundamental. That is, customers want to have 
the same coverage level as the existing services and improved quality at the first. Without 
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adequate connectivity, new complementary assets will get a bad reputation as a result of the 
lower quality of the platform. Even though attractive services and terminals may be 
provided in the first step, poor network quality will deaden customers’ enthusiasm 
immediately. The most important thing in the first step is to provide at lease the same 
performance as that of the existing platform. Considering services and content based on 
these points, transfer of the existing line-up is a factor to be done in this first step. After this, 
mobile network operators should not only advance but also innovate their complementary 
assets. This concept is discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.8.2. 4C Operation Model for Successful Platform Migration 
These four factors add attractiveness to a new platform. It can be assumed that these factors 
have influences on platform migration as shown in Figure 3-14.  
The increased attractiveness of the new platform encourages customers to transfer from the 
existing platform to the new one. Therefore platform migration will be accelerated if each 
of these factors offers a higher value than that in the exiting platform. In this model, one of 
the most important things is revenue from the existing services 
R&D cost, spectrum auctions cost, initial network coverage cost and a commission fee to 
the franchises are out of the revenue generated from the existing service. 
This means migration forms a reinforcing feedback loop as mentioned in Section 2.4.3. 
Without cash from the existing service, migration to the next platform migration will not be 
feasible. After new services launched, each of four factors will have an effect on service 
attractiveness. 
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Figure 3-14 4C Operation Model for Successful Platform Migration 
Finally, when the value of these four factors in the next platform is greater than in the 
existing one, platform migration will be accelerated. It is difficult to place these factors at a 
higher level during initial phase. Investment in coverage expansion is, for instance, quite 
expensive, because recent customer priority of the coverage moving from outdoor to indoor, 
namely in-building, underground, and so on, enhances the coverage designs from 
two-dimension (2D) to three-dimension (3D). Mobile operators should spend their capital 
year by year to complete these kinds of complicated coverage. Therefore, during the first 
few years, the coverage attractiveness of a new platform is smaller than that of existing one. 
This discourages customers from transferring to the next platform. 
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3.9. Implication of 3G migration in Japanese Market 
The 3G migrations in the Japanese market can be explained by means of the platform 
migration approach. Three incumbent operators, namely NTT DoCoMo, KDDI au and 
J-phone, have already launched their own 3G services.  
The platforms in DoCoMo and J-phone are based on IMT-2000 CDMA DS-CDMA 
(W-CDMA), while the platform in KDDI au is CDMA2000 1x MC, the upgrade version of 
cdmaOne. Therefore, DoCoMo and J-phone have to face with Revolution-type Migration 
from PDC platform. In particular, since DoCoMo challenged to implement the world’s first 
IMT-2000 in May 2001, DoCoMo have to expend its resources to improve the quality and 
expand the service coverage. Compared to the growth in KDDI CDMA2000, DoCoMo’s 
migration scenario was estimated as a reckless challenge in some presses, because of no 
killer application and no customer preference. 
 
But DoCoMo’s migration is just at the midway point of the first step of Revolution-type 
migration. Its technology leadership from its R&D arms, investment capability from 
i–mode breakthrough and value chain leadership through integration of complementary 
assets satisfied the requirements of Revolution-type migration adequately as shown in 
Figure 3-15. They now need to accelerate completion of service coverage to the same level 
as its PDC platform and to improve QoS. Actually, DoCoMo invested supportively in the 
development activities of its partner terminal vendor on Jan. 2003 in order to accelerate to 
reinforce the line-up of its 3G terminals6. Its powerful technology leadership and this value 
chain leadership will give DoCoMo successful results at the end of this bitter trail. The next 
                                                   
6 Source: NTT DoCoMo Press Release 16th Jan. 2003 
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DoCoMo’s challenge will be how new profitable services will be produced in its service 
innovation process after the completion of its 3G platform. 
 
Figure 3-15 Three Evaluation Criteria in NTT DoCoMo’s 3G Migration 
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3.10. Summary 
This chapter clarified “Platform Migration Dynamics” by means of the empirical 
analyses. The key points in this dynamics are the following: 
l The triggers of the platform migration process are the capacity shortage by traffic 
growth and the new functions for the next services.  
l Revolution-type migration and Evolution-type migration are the traditional process 
for platform migration. The backward compatibility with the existing platform 
determines the appropriate scheme. 
l Capability, Coverage, Cost and Complementary Assets are the critical factors for the 
platform migration. Successful platform migration arises from the effective operation 
of those tactics. 
l Three evaluation criteria, namely technology leadership, value chain leadership and 
investment capability, are proposed as the evaluation criteria for entry to the platform 
migration.  
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4.  Service Innovation Dynamics 
 
4.1. Overviews 
The main key issue in this chapter is clarification of the mechanism of the service 
innovation process. The discussion covers what the triggers of service innovation are, how 
innovative services for the mobile industry have been created in the past, and what the next 
approach to service innovation for future market changes should be.   
During the last decade, the mobile industry has seen two remarkable services, namely the 
Short Message Service (SMS) on the GSM platform and the i-mode service on the 
DoCoMo PDC-P platform. This chapter introduces these two services as examples of 
innovative services in the past. Empirical analysis shows that these were introduced as a 
result of the mental breakthrough approach. Additionally since the process for the i-mode 
service has allowed identification of some remarkable features, those can be enhanced in 
future service innovation process. 
 
4.2. Triggers in Service Innovation Dynamics 
4.2.1. Reversal of ARPU Decline 
Service innovation has been undertaken when mobile network operators were faced with a 
declining ARPU. As mentioned in Chapter 2, ARPU is one of the most useful measures for 
the evaluation of the customers’ usages and declines as time passees. An analysis of the 
decline in ARPU reveals two reasons. One is that customers lose interest in existing 
services, and the second is price reduction. In particular, pressure from the market for price 
reduction is a dominant factor (See Appendix 1).  
This research shows that price reduction for the purpose of increasing traffic does not 
always lead to improved ARPU as mobile operators expect. Generally price reduction 
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tempts low-end users, whose traffic is too low to contribute significantly to traffic growth to 
join the services, while it also encourages core users to use mobile services more frequently. 
However there is a possibility that the additional usage of core users might be insufficient 
to raise the total traffic. So it cannot be denied that ARPU might decrease even after price 
reduction. Therefore it is suggested that mobile operators should innovate new services and 
add value to their services in order to capture newly additional new ARPU.  
 
4.2.2. Platform Migration Cost 
There are two kinds of cost associated with platform migration. One is spectrum acquisition 
cost and the other is equipment upgrade cost. Firstly the spectrum acquisition cost depends 
on government policies and the form of auction in each country. For instance, the Japanese 
government did not ask the operators to pay a 3G license fee.  
In contrast to Japan, European countries held auctions for spectrum in which the auctions 
raised a total of over $100 billion (or over 1.5% of GDP) as shown in Table 4-1 (Klemperer, 
2002, Hart and Chapman 2002). The award of the licenses in Europe could well be seen as 
the turning point in the fortunes of the mobile network operators.  
In the US market, there are three pockets of spectrum, which have been considered by 
mobile operators as the best place to gain additional spectrum. These pockets of spectrum 
include NextWave spectrum, the Department of Defense and UHF spectrum. The FCC and 
US mobile operators have discussed these possibilities.  
73 
Table 4-1 3G Spectrum Auction Cost 
 Result of the auctions 3G Operators 
France Only the two largest incumbents bid for 
four “beauty contest” licenses priced at 
$4.74 billion each 
France Telecom 
SFR 
(Bouygues entered later) 
Germany Auction netted the most money from 
3G auctions, $45.85 billion 
Mobilcom Multimedia, E-plus, Group 3G, 
T-mobile, Viag interkom (currently O2), 
Mannesmann D2 (currently Vodafone D2) 
UK Raised $34 billion from its auctions 
held in April 2000 
Orange, Vodafone, O2, One-2-One 
Japan 3G spectrum available at no cost NTT DoCoMo, KDDI (au), J-phone 
 
Next, network cost, namely equipment upgrade cost, is the dominant factor in platform 
migration. Generally speaking, network cost depends on the compatibility with the existing 
platform, the population, size of the country and so on. For instance, platform migration 
from GSM to UMTS requires investing in infrastructure and subsidizing new 3G 
compatible handsets. These costs are just for upgrades, but these additional costs are 
expected to reach $80 billion in all networks worldwide. After the 3G auctions, Deutsche 
Telekom, owner of T-mobile, and British Telecom, formerly owner of mmO2, created a 
partnership to share the cost of constructing and maintaining their 3G network 
infrastructure in June 20017. Furthermore, one of mobile operators abandoned its 3G 
license8. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, it can be said that mobile network operators should recoup this 
investment through the revenue growth. Revenue recouped in this way will form the source 
of investment for the next platform migration. With respect to declining ARPU, it can be 
                                                   
7 Gartner Research 2002 
8 Broadband Mobile in Norway returned its 3G license, Gartner Research 2002 
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seen that platform migration by itself cannot lead to an increase in revenue. Therefore 
innovative services will be quite essential in allowing mobile network operators in order to 
grasp the opportunities for further growth, in reducing network costs simultaneously. 
 
4.3. Service Innovation Dynamics 
4.3.1. Dynamics for Future Investment Capability 
Compared to platform migration dynamics, service innovation dynamics will be quite 
important for mobile operators from now on, because it leads directly to revenue growth. 
Since the future mobile technologies will be made more complicated, the total cost of 
implementations will become more expensive. Therefore, mobile operators should innovate 
to produce new profitable services directly connected to investment capability in order to 
drive the next platform migration dynamics in the future. In addition, we should be 
considered that sophisticated future mobile technologies might lead to an 
“over-performance” situation that offers advanced services that go far beyond customer 
requirements. Mobile operators should avoid the situation where technology-oriented 
migration leads to the provision of services that are not wanted, and should instead drive 
the future migration process in accordance with customer preferences. In this respect, 
service innovation dynamics will be more important than platform migration for mobile 
operators. 
 
4.3.2. Service Innovation Dynamics 
The declining in ARPU and future migration costs are triggers of service innovation 
dynamics, as indicated in the model shown in Figure 4-1. Risk management considerations 
of these two critical factors should urge mobile operators to explore new sources of future 
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profitable services. Then they will reach innovative service breakthrough after several 
stages of trials and feedback. 
Figure 4-1 Service Innovation Dynamics 
Once mobile network operators achieve breakthrough of a new service, their traffic 
revenues improve dramatically. However, to meet service innovation is quite difficult, 
because future customer preferences are so unpredictable. In particular, the diversification 
of current customer preferences makes it even more difficult to create profitable future 
services. Therefore, mobile network operators have to experience many steps of “trial and 
feedback” in order to grasp the opportunities.  
This uncertainty in customer preference is another reason why mobile operators have 
hesitated to invest in service innovation up to now. Considering services introduced the past, 
mental breakthrough is the most successful approach for mobile operators. This approach 
means bringing a concept for new products and services from outside the industry before 
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there has been a demand for it. Historically, the mobile industry has experienced several 
breakthroughs of this kind, as shown in Table 4-2.  
For instance, the i-mode service is just a harmonization of mobile telecommunication and 
the Internet. The i-mode business model has other remarkable features such as the fee 
collection business, but this harmonization may be called a mental breakthrough. Another 
reason why these services were successful is that the mobile services involved collaboration, 
with handsets directly affecting the portal interface to the customers. Moreover, the 
dominant design of handsets might be a trigger for this service breakthrough. To summarize, 
these innovations resulted from a combination between mental breakthrough of service and 
dominant design of handsets.  
Table 4-2 Service Innovation Resulting from Mental Breakthrough 
Service Innovation Break Point Source of Innovation Handsets 
Digital Voice Around 1996 Wired Digital Voice Downsized 
Short Message 
Service (SMS) 
Around 1997 E-mail GSM Terminals 
Mobile Internet 
Access 
1999 Internet Browser Handsets 
Message with pictures 2001 Internet Camera Equipped 
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4.4. Analytical Framework for the Service Innovation Process 
This section provides an analytical framework for the service innovation process in terms 
of breakthrough management as shown in Figure 4-2.  
It can be assumed that four factors lead to breakthroughs of service innovation in the 
mobile industry, these being: prediction of a future crisis or problem, corporate 
management, technical background and innovation. Prediction of a future crisis stirs the 
operators to new action. In respect of service innovation, the predicted crises result from 
ARPU decline and, secondarily, future migration costs. 
Corporate management and organizational decisions are the critical factors that lead to the 
implementation of innovative services. With reference to migration dynamics, service 
breakthrough emerges after the completion of platform migration. This can be considered 
as the technical background for service breakthrough. The innovation process means the 
major steps leading to service breakthrough. Each operator has own process of service 
creation, but innovative services can be created by specific approaches. The difficulty of 
finding this process makes it hard to arrive at innovative services. 
Figure 4-2 Analytical Framework for the Service Innovation Process 
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4.5. Case Analysis of SMS Breakthrough 
This section and the next section examine two successful cases of service innovation 
through empirical analysis. These two services became widespread as a result of 
breakthrough management. In particular, the development process of i-mode was 
completely different from that of the previous services. Compared to those previous data 
services, the service innovation process of i-mode will be examined and the key points 
clarified.  
 
4.5.1. ARPU Decline in the European Market 
European mobile services have a long history and constitute a powerful market in the world. 
However fierce competition has forced European mobile operators to reduce their prices 
and provide cheaper services like free phone. This excessive competition has had a severe 
impact on their financial health and level of ARPU, even though the mobile market in 
Europe has grown rapidly. For instance, European mobile operators introduced prepaid cell 
phones in the early 1990s. From the customers’ point of view, the advantage of prepay is 
that it allows them to buy a phone straightway, without a credit check or a contract to sign. 
This convenience attracts even teenagers to own a cell phone. In contrast to the United 
States, where the penetration of prepay is around 10%, the prepay system accounts for 
two-thirds of all new mobile phone subscribers in Europe. From the operators’ points of 
view, the prepay system was originally a great way to grow the number of subscribers, but 
it has become something of a threat to their original customer base. In particular, the new 
market segment, which was attracted by the prepay system is not so heavy in traffic. 
Therefore as a result, ARPU did not grow as had been predicted, although both traffic and 
the market grew dramatically. It can be seen that this behavior by the European operators 
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had a severe impact on their ARPU level as shown in Figure 4-3.  
Figure 4-3 ARPU Comparison Q3 2002 
4.5.2. Background to SMS 
All 2G technologies have some functions for a messaging service. This service allows 
subscribers to receive and sometime send short text messages. It is quite similar to paging, 
but the bi-directional concept is the significant feature and the reason why it has contributed 
to traffic increase. Short Message Service (SMS) is one of these functions for the GSM 
system and it has spread through the worldwide market. It began as part of the original 
GSM specification, but the concept has since spread to all the other digital system.  
The spread of SMS basically depended on the situation in the European market as outlined 
above. That is, especially for pre-paid customers, SMS has often been a cheaper way to 
communicate, especially across networks. Then data ARPU in European mobile operators 
became relatively higher than that in United States market as shown in Figure 4-4. 
SMS’s greatest limitation is hinted at in its name: messages have to be short. GSM imposes 
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a limit of only 160 bytes, or characters. The limitation to such a short length arises because 
making use of vacant space in signaling channels called control channels sends the 
messages.  
Figure 4-4 Voice and Data ARPU Comparison Q3 2002 
As the result, this feature made this service more reasonably price and easier to use than 
other messaging services. SMS is known as a store-and forward service. Messages are 
stored in Short message centers for a few minutes, before the center transmits them to the 
recipient. Therefore, if operators owning systems different from GSM wish to implement 
this concept, they need to deploy such a center in their networks, with some enhancement 
of the transmission protocol.  
Its ease of use has encouraged customers to use it and this has contributed to traffic growth, 
but the first implementation of SMS was strategically limited and allowed users to 
communicate only with customers of the same operator. In 2000, the GSM Association 
(GSMA) advocated SMS interoperability over the boundary of GSM operators. Since then 
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usage of SMS has progressed dramatically as shown in Figure 4-5. SMS contributes about 
90 percent of data ARPU. That is, SMS is currently the dominant service in the European 
mobile data market. In respect of revenue, 5% of the total service revenue was from SMS. 
One research study has indicated that 25% of service revenue would be from SMS and 
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), an enhanced form of SMS, by 2005(Yunus, 2002). 
Figure 4-5 Data ARPU Growth in the European Market 
4.5.3. Breakthrough Management 
From the SMS case in Europe, we can see that there are two fundamental triggers for SMS 
breakthrough as shown in Figure 4-6. The first trigger is a declining in ARPU caused by 
fierce price reductions and introduction of the prepaid system. Risk management pushed 
the aggressive introduction of the SMS function and the deployment of GSM phones 
supporting SMS in the market. Secondly, the efforts of operators and the GSM Association 
to implement inter-operability across network boundaries caused the breakthrough.  
Those fundamental factors have been supported of several remarkable features of SMS, in 
particular the facts that GSM technologies were already implemented in European Market 
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and that the SMS pricing structure was cheaper than voice telephony for pre-paid users. 
Moreover, the mental breakthrough approach should be noticed. Basically SMS is like 
e-mail or the regular postal service. That is, sending and receiving a text-based message 
was not a new concept. In this respect, SMS is a mental breakthrough service drawn from 
the Internet and postal market. However the most remarkable point is that SMS is deployed 
on every GSM phone. The powerful portal of the cell phone was endowed with new value 
by SMS.  
Figure 4-6 SMS Breakthrough Management 
 
4.6. Case Analysis of i-mode Breakthrough  
4.6.1. ARPU Decline before i-mode 
After the PDC platform was implemented nationwide by 1997, the Japanese mobile market 
grew rapidly. Customers’ requirements changed from higher clarity of sound quality to 
lower initial cost and lower call charge. With fierce competition among mobile network 
operators, voice ARPU declined year by year as shown in Figure 4-7. In 1998, the i-mode 
service was launched and this has kept the total ARPU level approximately same as that of 
1998, since data ARPU has grown, while voice ARPU has continued to decrease. 
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Figure 4-7 ARPU Decline in DoCoMo  
4.6.2. Trial and Lessons before i-mode 
In the middle of the 1990s, some customers would have liked to their use cell phones as 
access tools to the Internet while out and about. In particular, some customers familiar with 
wireless products proposed the provision of data access even for analog cell phones. 
Dialing up to connect to the Internet was too difficult, since they had to modify the dial-up 
software themselves. These requests from these customers encouraged mobile network 
operators and vendors to enhance their services and product to include mobile data services 
as a new source of revenue. Although several types of data services had been proposed 
before the i-mode service, as shown in Table 4-3, these trial services did not contribute to 
halting the ARPU decline. One of the reasons why these services were not able to achieve 
breakthrough is that they focused on terminal enhancement, without an organized business 
model.  
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Table 4-3 DoCoMo’s Trial of Data Services before i-mode 
Service/Product Year Concept Environment 
10 yen mail 1997 E-mail Cell phone + PC/PDA 
Short mail service 1997 Messaging (Limited to 50 characters) 
Cell phone 
(Only to cell phone) 
Value mail 1998 E-mail  (Business use) Cell phone + PC/PDA 
mopera 1998 Internet Browsing Cell phone + PC/PDA 
Source: NTT DoCoMo 
4.6.3. Breakthrough Management 
After a number of trials to explore the mobile data market, DoCoMo arrived at the concept 
of Mobile Internet Access and control of the design of handsets as the i-mode phone.  
The breakthrough management model of DoCoMo is shown in Figure 4-8. 
Firstly mental breakthrough was applied to mobile services by bringing in the Internet 
business model. In addition, the attractiveness of handsets, equipped with an “all in one” 
concept with a large, color display, clamshell body and browsing function, matched 
customer preferences in the Japanese mobile market (Natsuno, 2003). 
Figure 4-8 i-mode Breakthrough Management 
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In respect of technical background, PDC-P, the packet transmission platform, had already 
been complete nationwide and so provided the push and pull environment. With i-mode, 
cellular phone users can get easy access to more than 60,000 Internet sites, as well as 
specialized services such as e-mail, online shopping and banking, ticket reservations, and 
entertainment services, as shown in Figure 4-9.  
Figure 4-9 i-mode Service Configuration 
Users can access sites from anywhere in Japan, and at unusually low call charge rates. This 
is because the service charges are based on the volume of data transmitted, and not the 
amount of time spent connected. DoCoMo's i-mode network structure not only provides 
access to i-mode and i-mode -compatible content through the Internet, but also provides 
access through a dedicated leased-line circuit for added security.  
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4.7.1. Mental Breakthrough from Internet Services 
The messaging services and mobile Internet access services created new value for mobile 
services. These services are not original, but the transfer of the Internet concept to the 
mobile platform, with some modifications, was quite effective because mobile handsets 
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provide a user-friendly interface. As a result, users have gradually changed their usages 
from voice telephony services to data transmission. The business model of the primary 
i-mode services was focused on B2C. Despite the lower speed of the radio interface, the 
i-mode services are focused on “light” content such as text-based messaging, e-mail, music, 
transactions and entertainment, and this enabled DoCoMo to capture the new mobile 
business market. By using this packet technology, subscribers can access sites from 
anywhere, usually at low rates because they are charged in accordance with the volume of 
data transmitted, but not the amount of time spend connected.    
 
4.7.2. Profitability Capture 
The SMS and the i-mode service have some ingenious features, which enhance its 
attractiveness. In this study, two distinctive characteristics, which are discussed below, 
indicate the future approaches of mobile operators to service innovation. One is the 
integration of complementary assets such as content providers and terminals, and the other 
is partnership with firms familiar with their particular industries. 
 
Partnership with terminal vendors: The maturity of handsets had a great influence on the 
mobile industry. Generally, the product, which acquires the leadership in the market, is 
called “dominant design” (Utterback, 1994). Since it is difficult to reach the design, mobile 
operators need to survey the trends in customer preference carefully and provide the new 
terminals on time. In this respect, mixture of the marketing and the close relationship with 
terminal vendors are the critical points. Now the terminal vendors have a powerful 
bargaining power in the market. Therefore the partnership with them will be one of the 
critical factors for mobile operators.   
87 
Partnership with content providers: An important factor influencing the rapid success of 
i-mode is the strong partnerships with the content providers (CPs). Other than the 
attractiveness and business opportunities created by DoCoMo’s dominant market-share, the 
rich line-up of content provided by CPs has encouraged many customers to access them. 
The strategy for this partnership is the “i-mode license”. Although CPs can provide content 
over the i-mode platform without a license (called “voluntary sites”), CPs which have a 
license with DoCoMo are known as “official sites” and are guaranteed to have many 
privileges, for instance, the collection of payment for content through DoCoMo’s billing 
system and the allocation of official pages. This kind of partnership can be applied to 
Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS), enhanced SMS.  
 
4.7.3. Implications and recommendations 
In the two cases, the remarkable traffic growth shows that mental breakthrough was the key 
approach providing these new services for the mobile industry. These were based on the 
Internet business model, but this conception suggests that the various perspectives of other 
industries could provide mobile operators with new ideas for innovative services. In this 
respect, partnership with companies well-informed in the other industries is essential in 
reaching the breakthrough required to capturing the necessary information from these 
development partners (Shiba and Walden, 1993). 
 
The other key issue is then how to create new services for sustainable growth. The analysis 
of these two cases is just second-guessing. Considering the uncertainty in the customer 
preference, it will be more difficult to foresee the future profitable services. However, 
mobile operators can compensate their lack of experience with close partnership. In 
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addition, technology leadership will enable them to acquire the favorite terminals and 
equipment on time. Therefore both partnership and technology leadership are the critical 
resources that mobile operators need to hold.  
 
In the relationship between DoCoMo and content provider, we can see the organized 
corporate assistance in terms of the “toolkit” concept. Some research studies on service 
innovation have indicated that companies may give content providers real freedom to 
innovate their own content, so allowing them to develop their own custom product (von 
Hippel, 2001). DoCoMo encouraged content providers to propose various kinds of content 
services by providing toolkits, namely, compact HTML and Java. In particular, since 
HTML is the dominant language in the Internet content business, choosing a language 
compatible to HTML gave content providers great opportunities to entry to the mobile 
Internet business. In addition, these toolkits encouraged voluntary content providers to 
enter this business field, since it made it easy for them to do so. This illustrates how value 
of innovative services may be added from the market itself.  
 
4.8. Service Innovation Model  
The service innovation process has not yet really become established in the mobile business. 
Of course, to grasp the opportunities of the service sources is too difficult. However mobile 
network operators need to recognize the importance of the service innovation in migration 
process and create its dynamics in order to achieve competitive advantages. Referring to the 
lessons from SMS and i-mode, the transplantation of an idea from outside was introduced. 
In this respect, the Internet is only one possible source of new ideas. For future service 
innovation, mobile network operators should consider more different types of industry to 
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gather idea for applying mobile technologies or services. After identifying some critical 
ideas, mobile network operators should build well-defined partnerships and encourage their 
partners to create new sources for services, while the mobile operators themselves also 
continue the challenge of identifying further ideas.    
Figure 4-10 Service Innovation Model for Content Services 
4.9. Implication of 3G migration in the European Market  
European mobile operators are faced with the 3G migrations like Japan. Their problems in 
this migration can be clarified by means of the service innovation dynamics. 
They are experiencing trouble with regard to their severe financial situation resulting from 
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the extremely costly spectrum auction. However according to the migration model, they 
failed to evaluate two points, namely the level of investment capability and the migration 
cycle from GPRS platform to the UMTS platform. In particular, time-contiguous platform 
migrations are too expensive for mobile operators. Their original scenario for UMTS is 
based on successful GPRS migration with MMS breakthrough. Improved investment 
capability from MMS and transfer of the MMS business model were key factors in entry to 
the UMTS migration cycle. Unfortunately European mobile operators were faced with a 
delayed release of GPRS handsets in the market, which disrupted their original migration 
scenarios. Compared to successful migration processes, this sort of platform migration 
should be avoided, because European operators will have to double investment in their 
platform.  They should delay the implementation of 3G platforms until they captured 
profitable services, which will improve their financial condition, or wait for their MMS 
breakthrough as shown in Figure 4-11. 
Figure 4-11 Time-contiguous Platform Migration in UMTS Migration 
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4.10. Summary 
In this chapter, service innovation dynamics was discussed. The points are the following: 
l Since service innovation contributes directly to the future traffic growth, mobile 
operators should pursue the source of new profitable services.  
l The two triggers, namely “Decline in ARPU” and “Platform Migration Cost”, cause 
the service innovation process in the mobile industry.  
l Mental breakthrough approach has been one of the popular schemes in mobile 
service innovation.  
l One of the key factors is partnership with the companies that familiar with the new 
industries. Considering the uncertainty in customer preferences, to reach the profitable 
services will be more difficult. Therefore, the mixture of partnership and technology 
leadership will be also critical factors in successful service innovation. 
l In the i-mode case, DoCoMo provided not only Win-Win business model, namely 
billing collection business, but also sets of toolkits composed of common software and 
applications, which encourage many content providers to support the new business.  
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5. Future Directions in Mobile Telecommunication Industry 
 
5.1. Overviews 
The research study focuses on the analysis about the migration process in the current 
mobile industry up to Chapter 4. Considering the future direction in the mobile market, we 
have to foresee the trends in future mobile services and clarify the strategies for future 
successful migration, according to the roadmap to the future services and the migration 
scheme in the past. This chapter, firstly, forecasts the future mobile services and the 
platform configurations, taking account of the roadmap analysis. Secondly, future platform 
migration scheme, namely “Collaboration-type migration”, is proposed for the convergence 
network situation. Finally, since the technological performance of mobile operators is quite 
critical to drive the migration process, the current performances of mobile network 
operators, compared to those of mobile vendors, are measured in the rest of this chapter. 
 
5.2. Roadmap to the Future Mobile Services 
5.2.1. Overviews 
Over the previous decade mobile and wireless technologies have been improved 
dramatically. During this era, customer priorities were not complicated and the focus was 
on technology enhancement. However such rapid market growth has promoted 
commoditization of mobile services, and customer preference will be more diversified from 
now on. Then it will become harder to forecast the future service trends, but mobile 
operators need to prepare an integrated network environment to handle this diversification. 
This section forecasts the future mobile services and the platform configurations by means 
of the following factors: future customer preference, technology dynamics, regulatory 
dynamics, industry structure and corporate strategies dynamics. 
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5.2.2. Customer Preference and Service Dynamics 
There are two directions in the future mobile services. One is “All in mobile”, and the other 
is “Mobile in all” as shown in Figure 5-1. “All in mobile”, the main trend up to now, 
focuses on the enhancement of the mobile handsets. The target segment in the market is the 
traffic from both the customer uses and the business uses. “Mobile in all” will be new 
trends based on the ubiquitous environment and mean the harmonization between mobile 
and any kinds of the products and services. 
Figure 5-1 Two Directions in the Mobile Service Innovation 
Firstly, “All in mobile” is so quite fundamental concept that customer preferences 
encouraged mobile terminals to equip kinds of functions, namely voice telephony, Internet 
access, messaging, commerce and so on. It is quite difficult to foresee the future customer 
preferences in the commodity market, but the supposed services are more diversified. 
Considering the future traffic growth, mobile operators need to explore the new business 
field, while they continue progressing the “all in mobile” evolution for the end users. One 
of the powerful directions is “Mobile in all”. This means the small devices equipped with 
the mobile communication are applied to any kinds of product. Future ubiquitous services, 
namely telematics, M to M communications will be based on this “mobile in all” concept. 
The noteworthy point is that these business fields may have various kinds of traffic patterns, 
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in which call occurrences are not relatively frequent. However this new trends will 
contribute to the traffic increase cumulatively. These trends will force the mobile operators 
to make their business field more diversified. Therefore, the operators need to survey them 
carefully and adjust their organization more flexibly. 
 
5.2.3. Technology Dynamics beyond the Third Generation 
The noteworthy points in the future mobile technologies are “convergence network” in the 
mobile platforms and “evolved mobile devices” in the mobile terminals. 
Firstly, considering the future platform technologies, some common capabilities, namely 
higher transmission speed, higher mobility and ubiquity, are required for the technology 
beyond the third generation (B3G9) (Yamao et al, 2000). ITU-R, a study sector in ITU 
focusing on the radio interface, has already described a future vision of B3G technologies 
as shown in Figure 5-2.  
Figure 5-2 ITU-R Vision of Beyond 3G 
                                                   
9 The fourth generation technologies (4G) are not clarified in the ITU still now, because of its 
uncertainty in the market requirement. Basically some study groups have started to clarify the 
requirement for the system after IMT-2000. They call this technologies “Beyond IMT-2000”. In 
this research, I would like to define the technologies beyond the third generation (B3G) as the 
term for more general concept of this kind of technologies. 
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The degree of mobility as used in this figure is described as follows: low mobility covers 
pedestrian speeds, and high mobility covers high-speed movement on highways or in fast 
trains (60 km/h to ~250 km/h, or more).B3G technologies will form an integrated system 
composed of existing systems such as IMT-2000, and also enhanced functions, nomadic 
wireless access systems and any other wireless systems as shown in Table 5-1.  
Table 5-1 Possible Wireless Interface Specifications 
 Specification Peak Data Rate Radio 
Bandwidth 
Complementary service 
2G(GSM) 14.4 kbps 800MHz Voice, Text-base content 
3G(IMT-2000) 384kbps – 2Mbps 2GHz Multimedia  
Long-range and high 
mobility Wireless 
(Mobile technologies) B3G (F.F.S) Around 100Mbps - Rich content in Multimedia 
IEEE802.11a 6Mbps-54Mbps 5.4GHz 
IEEE802.11b 2Mbps-11Mbps 2.4GHz 
HiperLAN/2 54Mbps 5.15-5.3GHz 
W-LAN for Internet connect Short-range Wireless 
(Fixed Wireless) 
Bluetooth 2Mbps-12Mbps 5.4GHz Inter PCs and Equipments 
Source: The Essential Guide to Telecommunications 
These technologies should provide seamless inter-working between these systems. The 
basic requirements for performance of future mobile technologies are 100Mbps data 
transmission in higher mobility environments and around 1Gbps data transmission in lower 
mobility environments. Then some companies have also started to investigate the future 
cellular specifications for B3G technologies, and some of them have provided better 
performance than that of 3G in the laboratories10. 
                                                   
10 NTT DoCoMo Laboratory has succeeded with around 100 Mbps downlink in its indoor test bed 
by means of OFCDM (Orthogonal Frequency Code Division Multiplexing). NTT DoCoMo Press 
Release 9th Oct. 2002 
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A more detail diagram of the B3G platform is shown in Figure 5-3. This figure shows that 
multiple wireless interfaces are linked to a single core network. The core network 
technologies will be required to provide flexible inter-working and quality management 
with seamless communication services. 
Figure 5-3 Network Configuration of B3G 
Recent technology trends indicate that IP technologies will be deployed in the mobile core 
network for the efficient use of network resource and cost reduction. However the 
implementation of seamless services will force mobile operators to concentrate on 
complicated quality control procedures. Quality of Services (QoS) across the boundaries of 
diversified network systems will be also needed. 
 
Another technology trend is “evolved mobile devices”. Considering the innovations in the 
other industries, namely biotechnologies and nanotechnologies, will have a great impact on 
the future mobile terminals as shown inFigure 5-4. In particular, nanotechnologies will 
make the mobile devices much smaller by provision of the advanced integrated chip and 
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DNA chip. These smaller devices will enable mobile operators to provide diversified 
products and services in the “mobile in all” situation.  
Figure 5-4 Evolution of the Mobile Terminals by Bioelectronics 
5.2.4. Regulatory Dynamics and Industry Structure  
The viewpoint of regulatory dynamics also allows us to see the movement to a converged 
network. From the record of government policies concerning the telecommunications 
industry, we noted that historical trends pointed towards an environment encouraging 
deregulation and resulting in the current modularity and disintegration of the industry. For 
instance in the case of US government policies, noteworthy policy change in 1984 and the 
telecommunications act of 1996 resulted in the following: 
· Vertical disintegration of telecommunications operation and manufacturing (i.e. US 
Government vs. West Electrics and Government vs. AT&T) 
· Horizontal disintegration of telecommunications operation, in order to encourage 
new entrants and competition (1984 long distance operators, 1996 local operators) 
· Reducing the barriers between different telecom industries such as local, long 
distance, CATV and wireless. 
In contrast to the success in the 1984 deregulation in promoting the growth of the industry, 
the 1996 Act did not urge the new entrants to expand their business, but resulted in them 
being acquired by the big operators (Economides, 1999). These deregulatory policies will 
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continue to encourage not only telecom operators but also mobile operators to penetrate to 
their own and other telecom industries through further mergers and acquisitions.  
 
This horizontal integration in the mobile industry is quite effective for mobile operators, 
because they can reduce network cost by procurement of large amount of network 
equipment and increase their traffic revenue by the global roaming service (Kedia, 2001, 
Trillas, 2002). Therefore, some mobile operators have accelerated to integrate their market 
horizontally in these five years as shown in Figure 5-5. 
Figure 5-5 Horizontal Integration in the Mobile Industry 
From this viewpoint, it can be assumed that the world’s big operators, called Mega-Carriers, 
such as some European operators (Vodafone, Orange and T-mobile), some US operators 
(Verizon Wireless, Cingular, Sprint and AT&T Wireless), and DoCoMo will lead the future 
worldwide mobile services. In addition, these operators, even though they have been 
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segmented in each industry, still maintain the close relationships with their subsidiaries. By 
combining their network resources to establish a ubiquitous network, each of the telecom 
companies can share the various kinds of complementary assets. 
 
Another restructure in this industry is related to the public network telecommunications. 
The public network operators historically have a great influence on the mobile industry 
even now. That is, they are holding the share of some leading mobile operators as shown in 
Figure 5-6.  
Figure 5-6 Relationship with Public Network Operators 
These relationships limit the mobile operators’ behavior, however they can use technical 
resources of their parent companies. In case of mmO2, former BT Cellnet, was spun off 
from BT group completely on November 2002, however it keep the rights to use 
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convergence network structure in terms of the network resources11. AT&T Wireless was 
separated from AT&T Corp. by an Initial Public Offering (IPO) in July 2000. However, a 
wide range of cooperative agreements remains in effect. 
 
These integrations will produce new services and market structures with technology 
innovations (Fine, 1998). The technology innovations, namely IP v6, mobile IP and future 
B3G, will give powerful compatibility to mobile network infrastructures with fixed 
networks operators and Internet providers. These technical advantages with the horizontal 
integrations will accelerate leading mobile operators to produce the large convergence 
networks and services. For instance, NTT DoCoMo has, with AOL, established its Internet 
service operator, DoCoMo AOL12 in order to realize future fixed-mobile convergent 
services (Kalakota and Robinson, 2001). 
 
5.2.5. Corporate Strategies Dynamics in Mobile Value Chain 
The paradigm changes, in the telecommunications industry, force telecom operators to 
improve their corporate strategies in the value chain (Kawashima, 2002). In the mobile 
value chain, two dynamics are existed in the mobile value chain. One is dynamics by 
mobile operators and the other is by equipment suppliers, known as vendors in this study. 
As a result of the recent globalization of mobile technologies has enabled some vendors to 
develop stronger power in this value chain as the market has grown (Munsinger, 2002). 
This means that they have been able to cross the boundaries and develop powerful 
bargaining powers to mobile operators. Unlike the situation of vendors, mobile network 
                                                   
11 Source: mmO2 Annual Report  
12 Source: NTT DoCoMo press release 24th Jan. 2001 
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operators had been limited to their home nations and so had lost opportunities until 
deregulation emerged. In the respect, the case of Nokia is shown in Figure 5-7. Its current 
bargaining power based on supplying kinds of terminals cannot be ignored (Steinbock, 
2001). 
Figure 5-7 Two Types of Leadership in the Mobile Value Chain 
Another dynamics is from mobile operators. NTT DoCoMo has shown its leadership in the 
Japanese mobile value chain. DoCoMo’s powerful bargaining power in the Japanese mobile 
industry is based on the partnerships with both content providers by the Win-Win business 
model and vendors through the technical alliances. In addition, its powerful R&D arm also 
enables itself to propose lots of technical contributions to standards body like Nokia. 
Considering its logistics, DoCoMo also has a number of franchised retail shops, called 
DoCoMo-shop, throughout the countries. This value chain leadership becomes more 
popular in other leading mobile operators, namely Vodafone, Orange, and so on.  
The advantages based on the vertical integrations will accelerate mobile operators and 
vendors to have kinds of partnership and alliances in the future. 
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5.2.6. Summary 
Key issues in this section are to clarify the future platform and services. The points 
indicated above are the following: 
l Future mobile services can be categorized into the two directions: “All in mobile” and 
“Mobile in all”. The “mobile in all” will contribute to the traffic increase cumulatively. 
l Next generation technologies such as B3G will be composed of a unique core network 
and kinds of wireless technologies. This means that network configuration of the next 
platform will be based on the “Convergence Network” concept.  
l Not only technology dynamics but also other dynamics, namely regulatory, corporate 
strategies and industry structures go forward to the integration of various kinds of 
technologies.  
l The corporate strategies of mobile operators should be based on the partnerships with 
the other players in the value chain. 
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5.3. Platform Migration for Beyond the Third Generation (B3G) 
 
5.3.1. Overviews 
Two types of platform migration have been examined in Chapter 3. These are for providing 
higher transmission speed and higher capacity to all customers in their existing service area. 
However, when we look at the market segments, not all customers require such a higher 
transmission environment. Therefore mobile operators need to investigate new type of 
platform migration in order to match the future customer preferences. With reference to the 
roadmap to the technologies beyond 3G (B3G), this section proposes Collaboration-type 
migration for future migration paths. 
 
5.3.2. Assumed Migration Scenario to B3G 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, some standardization bodies and companies have already 
started to investigate B3G technologies. It is natural that wireless interfaces will need to 
provide a higher transmission speed for downloading richer content and services. However 
future customer requirements are unclear still, because even 3G technologies have not 
expanded to cover the market. Therefore mobile operators need to design the next platform 
with the careful survey of the future customer preferences. As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, 
since some substitutes for higher transmission speed interface have already proposed, the 
concept of the convergence network with several interface technologies is quite feasible for 
avoiding to invest in out-performed technology and redundant platform migration.  
On the other hand, traffic has some geographical features. That is, high-speed data services 
are often required in relatively urban areas because of the business use. Considering that 
these mobile data services will be diversified, ranging from lower speed data to higher 
speed data, new wireless technologies, namely OFDCM, may be applied to the limited area 
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where high speed traffic will be estimated. Or, alternatively, it may take a longer time to 
complete its coverage. Then backward compatibility providing seamless services will 
support these situations. Moreover, indoor deployment of wireless equipment will be more 
popular, because the wireless communications environment will be required from outside to 
inside of buildings. 
 
5.3.3. Migration Cycle for B3G 
As mentioned in Section 3.6.4, mobile network operators should pursue Evolution-type 
migration for financial efficiency. Actually this type of migration has a profitable feature 
for handling in uncertainty of traffic increase, owing to its backward compatibility. 
However, considering the geographical characteristics of traffic and future customer 
preferences, we can deploy new platform technologies at specific points and retain these 
collaborated conditions for a longer time. In this situation, the existing platform will have a 
longer life and platform migration will take longer, as shown in  Figure 5-8. 
 Figure 5-8 Migration Cycle in 3G and B3G 
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5.3.4. Collaboration-type Migration 
The newly suggested platform migration process is the Collaboration-type scheme, which 
can be categorized as strategic Evolution-type migration. That means long-range 
collaborated conditions between the existing platform and the next platform. The 
comparison between complete migration and this Collaboration-type migration is shown in  
Figure 5-9. 
 Figure 5-9 Comparisons of Complete Migration and Collaboration-type Migration 
Both Evolution-type and Revolution-type can be referred as the complete platform 
migration, because new technologies should be implemented and replace the existing 
technologies during short period. However, to avoid such large investments in network 
infrastructure, mobile operators will be able to choose to keep this Collaboration-type 
situation of two platforms. As mentioned, generally mobile network operators replace their 
platform to new platform in order to provide higher transmission speed service and 
maintain their infrastructure efficiently. However the operation of the wireless interfaces 
with backward compatibility and the maintenance of core network enable mobile operators 
to improve their financial condition more efficiently. Moreover mobile operators can 
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upgrade to the next platform according to the customer requirements.  
 
Mobile operators need to pay respect to three technical points: backward compatibility, 
convergence of networks and quality control in order to realize the Collaboration-type 
migration. First, backward compatibility is an essential function for gradual migration. Next, 
mobile operators should investigate sharing core network resources for efficient 
management. This means that the core network will support several wireless interfaces 
simultaneously as a convergence network13. Therefore mobile network operators should 
investigate the core network structure more carefully, taking initiatives in the converged 
situation. Finally, QoS management systems in the network guarantee a certain bandwidth 
and seamless services according to a service level agreement with customers. The current 
trend is to maintain a certain bandwidth by collaboration between the traffic management 
system, policy server and QoS management system. Therefore, quality control needs to be 
designed more detail for seamless services. 
 
5.3.5. Recommended Process for Collaboration-type Migration 
Because its features are related to Evolution-type migration, some of the factors in 
Collaboration-type migration needed not to be changed. The point in which it is most 
different from the Evolution-type is coverage. In Collaboration-type migration, mobile 
network operators do not have to accelerate replacement as shown in Figure 5-10. They can 
deploy new equipment at specific areas where a specific segment of customers would like 
                                                   
13 “Convergence Network” concepts are particularly discussed for the combination of public 
telecommunication services and the Internet. However, in the stretched convergence concept, 
mobile core network can support not only cellular technologies but also wired and wireless LAN 
technologies. 
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to use the new platform technologies. 
As mobile network operators confirm the effect of the new technologies, they can allocate 
these technologies in accordance with the expansion of customer requirements. Moreover, 
the backward compatibility allows customers to use the new mobile terminals in the area 
deploying the existing platform. As a result, operators can provide various kinds of pricing 
strategies from the initial provision of the new technologies. 
Figure 5-10 Collaboration-type Migration Process 
5.3.6. Summary 
This section proposed “Collaboration-type migration”, enhanced Evolution-type 
migration. Considering the future technological trends, convergence network and integrated 
wireless interfaces will be the core technologies. In particular, the cycle of each wireless 
interface will be longer than that of the previous generations. Therefore, mobile operators 
can consider new scheme by means of advantages from convergence network. This scheme 
has some technical problems to be solved, namely backward compatibility, seamless 
communications, and QoS control. But its efficient deployment of network equipment 
will be quite effective for mobile operators to reduce the budget of huge network cost. 
Coverage A
(existing)
Complementary assets
(Transfer)
Complementary Assets
(Service Innovation)
Capacity 
Increase
Platform Migration Service Innovation
Coverage B
(next)
Migration
(next)(Heavy traffic Area)
(Rural Area)
Cost Strategic Pricing
108 
5.4. Measuring the Technical Performance of Mobile Operators 
 
5.4.1. Overviews 
This chapter clarifies the current technological performance of mobile network operators, 
because technological capability is quite important in driving both platform migration and 
service innovation. Considering the mobile technology innovation, some technical factors, 
namely R&D Expenditure, a number of contributions to the international standardization 
bodies and essential IPR in stable specifications.  
 
5.4.2. Required Technical Competencies for Mobile Network Operators 
In all migration processes, one of the most important factors is technical capability. 
Some implications from analyses up to now indicate that mobile network operators should 
think about four capabilities, namely technology investigation, process management, 
quality control and service creation as shown in Figure 5-11.  
Figure 5-11 Capabilities for Technology Leadership 
In particular, technical investigation capability and process management are quite important 
because these two capabilities are mainly responsible for driving the migration process.  
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Service creation can be supported by various kinds of partners, while quality control can be 
counted as a form of process management. First of all, the R&D Expenditure of mobile 
operators is clarified in order to show the current state of R&D arm of them. The actual 
performance is shown, compared to that of mobile vendors.  
 
5.4.3. Measuring R&D Performance for Platform Innovation 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, Evolution-type is better than Revolution-type migration for 
mobile network operators. For implementing the Evolution-type, mobile network operators 
need to have enough capabilities in areas such as technology investigation to drive the 
platform innovation. This means that a higher research and development performance than 
that of manufacturers will be needed. This section clarifies the process of platform 
innovation and measures the current R&D performance of mobile network operators. 
Generally, the requirement for R&D performance depends on the features of industry (Shim, 
1999). As shown in Chapter 2, mobile platform technologies, particularly the wireless 
interface have been standardized in international organizations. This means that mobile 
technology has been closely related to spectrum allocation, which is also controlled 
internationally. With reference to this position of the mobile industry, three measurements 
are proposed as evaluation criteria: R&D Expenditure, the number of “contributions” to 
standardization bodies and Essential IPR (EIPR). That is to say, these measurements allow 
evaluation of the presence and effectiveness of an R&D arm, the capability of technical 
investigation, and the power of technology leadership in platform innovation as shown in 
Figure 5-12. 
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 Figure 5-12 Measures of Technology Leadership of Mobile Network Operators 
 
5.4.4. R&D Expenditure 
Generally R&D strength is quite important for many companies in order to lead technology 
trends. Mobile operators and vendors propose that the result of their investigations become 
standardized specifications, by means of contributions to standards bodies. A recent survey 
of R&D expenditure of the telecom industry shows that many telecom operators have 
reduced their investment in R&D as shown in Figure 5-13. These expenditure figures were 
obtained from R&D Ratio & Budgets, Compustat Database and R&D Expenditure Book 
(1995 to 2000). In particular, operator’s intensity of investment in R&D has been around 
3%, compared to around 11% of vendor’s R&D intensity.  
Additionally, as mentioned in Section 5.2.4, almost all mobile network operators do not 
own their R&D arms because some of them were spun off from public network operators 
and others were new entrants from another industry. Some mobile network operators have 
retained their relationship with their parent companies to share some of intellectual property 
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concerning mobile technologies. However the current level of R&D shows that mobile 
network operators have not respected the need for technology innovation.  
Figure 5-13 R&D Expenditure in the Mobile Industry 
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wireless interfaces are key technologies for global mobility, and these are associated with 
the allocation of spectrum. The relationships between standardization organizations and 
companies are shown in Figure 5-14.  
Figure 5-14 Standardization Process 
5.4.6. Contributions to the Standardization Bodies 
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specifications and, in the end, approved as standard specifications. The number of 
contributions can be one of the measures of not only companies’ interest in the technology 
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Technical Specifications Groups (TSGs). Each TSG is allocated to functional components 
of IMT-2000. 
Figure 5-15 the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
In this analysis, I used document lists from 1999 to 2002 of the Technical Specification 
Group for Radio Access Network (TSG-RAN), in which the wireless interface and its 
control protocol have been discussed. These data are shown on the official 3GPP web site. 
Some kinds of contributed document, such as liaison with other study groups, editing 
reports and agendas of meetings are excluded from this analysis. Contributions proposed 
jointly by several companies are counted by dividing them by the number of contributing 
companies. The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 5-16. The total number of 
contributions in these four years was 25,567 articles.  
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The contributions from operators are around 8% of the total. This means that vendors have 
the dominant influences in investigations in this study group. Additional analysis involving 
a breakdown of the different operators’ contributions shows that the main contributors were 
NTT DoCoMo, Vodafone, SK Telecom and Telia. These operators have their own R&D 
arms and try to take initiatives in TSG-RAN. These tendencies can also be seen in other 
study groups in 3GPP.  
 
5.4.7. Essential IPR 
Technology leaders in standardization bodies wish, at the same time, to establish their 
intellectual property rights (IPR) based on their internal investigation in order to protect 
their proposals to the standardization bodies. After specifications are frozen, IPR holders 
register some of their IPRs, which are essential in the implementation of the standards, to 
standardization bodies as “Essential IPR (EIPR)”. Despite such self-declaration, EIPR has a 
powerful influence in the implementation, because the ownership of essential IPR may 
strengthen a firm's position in a supply chain and alliance network (Megantz, 1996). 
Essential IPR can be defined as protected knowledge that is indispensable for a product that 
has to comply with that standard. Therefore, the number of items of EIPR in 
standardization is another measure of companies' technological capability. In this research, 
the number of EIPR declared in European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) 
for UMTS were investigated. 
This analysis is based on the registered EIPR shown on the official web site of ETSI and 
focused on the EIPR for UMTS up to March 2003. I have omitted IPR accepted by 
different countries under the same title, because this web site counts these IPR as different 
ones. Therefore inclusive IPRs are counted as one IPR in this analysis. Figure 5-17 shows a 
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comparison of EIPR between operators and vendors using the same analysis also for GSM. 
This means that, compared with GSM standardization, the technology leadership of mobile 
operators clearly reduced in UMTS standardizations. 
Figure 5-17 Essential IPR for UMTS 
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Additional analysis involved correlation between contributions and EIPR. It can be seen 
that some of powerful vendors such as Motorola, Ericsson, Nokia and Qualcomm were able 
to relate their contributions effectively to EIPR, as shown in Figure 5-18. 
Figure 5-18 Correlation between Number of Contributions and Essential IPR 
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This means that these vendors propose their investigations strategically and have a clear 
influence on specifications. Another conclusion from this analysis is that contributions from 
operators are focused only on requirements and are not based on solid technical 
background.  
 
5.4.9. Summary 
Over the last decade, vendors have improved their technology background as the market 
has grown globally. Technology leadership in mobile platform innovations has already 
moved from network operators to vendors. These series of analysis can clarify the reduced 
leadership of mobile network operators in the standardization process. The reduced 
leadership can have severe influences on the migration process as mentioned in Chapter 3. 
It will be more difficult for mobile network operators without technological leadership to 
drive platform migration process. That is they will hardly be able to acquire information 
about when specifications will be launched, what kinds of technologies will be released, 
how quality of service will be improved. In particular, they are only involved in 
outsourcing vendors to supply complete network element. These tendencies could be seen 
in the delayed schedule of GPRS in European countries in 1999.   
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6. Future Migration Strategies for Competitive Advantage 
 
6.1. Overviews 
Considering the implications in the study, the following two requirements can be suggested 
for future migration dynamics. Firstly mobile operators should pursue profitable services 
for revenue growth and investment capability towards next platform migration. Second they 
should also avoid redundant investment in platform innovation and migration.  
Currently huge migration costs have prevented many operators from installing new 
technologies dynamically. Mobile operators need to invest in their platforms at regular 
interval, but they should also exploit new services in a way that encourages customers to 
use the new platform. Therefore, mobile operators should drive migration dynamics with an 
orientation to service innovation, and adopt efficient platform migration such as the 
Collaboration-type scheme.  
This chapter proposes two key strategies for successful migration, which offer competitive 
advantages to mobile network operators. First, they should concentrate on “Successive 
Service Innovations”, in which mobile operators diversify their investment in several 
service fields and create profitable services successively on a platform. Second, mobile 
network operators should survey new technology trends for backward compatibility and 
evaluate their leadership and capability in the industry. Third, they should also organize the 
environment to create innovative service in conjunction with their external partners, 
because future mobile services will penetrate to every business and service field. In 
particular, they should prepare various kinds of applications to encourage these partners to 
create and enhance new services by themselves. 
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6.2. Driving Migration Process by Successive Service Innovation 
This research has clarified that investment capability is one of the critical criteria for entry 
to the platform migration and is just the revenue from existing services. If they are not able 
to earn enough capital from existing services, they should hold back on the platform 
migration process and look for alternative strategies. Therefore, mobile operators need to 
drive migration process, concentrating on service innovation dynamics. 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.2, there will be two service dynamics, namely “all in mobile” 
and “mobile in all” in the mobile market. In particular, “mobile in all” will be the not 
explored but potential market in the future. Cumulative traffic from kinds of “mobile in all” 
services will be the new source of traffic revenue. The most important point is that not all 
services require high-speed transmission. The combined effect of a number of small traffic 
will also be as important as large data transmission services as shown in  Figure 6-1.  
 Figure 6-1 Multiple Waves of Service Innovation on a Platform 
It will therefore become more important for mobile operators, not only to pursue 
sophisticated transmission technologies but also to explore new service sources. Therefore 
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it can be proposed that mobile operators should drive the migration process model by 
concentrating on the service innovation process as shown in Figure 6-2. 
Figure 6-2 Successive Service Innovation 
Considering advantages of improved investment capability, it will enable mobile operators 
to enhance their technology leadership. It is natural that the reduction of network cost will 
be effective to drive migration process as well as the profitable services for the next 
migration. Choosing the appropriate migration scheme and also enhancing the technology 
leadership will enable mobile operators to entry the migration process more smoothly. This 
issue is discussed in next section. 
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6.3. Strategies for Future Platform Migration 
6.3.1. How to Choose among the Platform Migration Schemes 
This study has already clarified three types of platform migration as Evolution-type, 
Revolution-type and Collaboration-type. Considering a particular operators’ position, one 
additional approach is not to select platform migration at all, but to skip to the following 
platform. In this study, this scheme is called “Skipping”.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, service innovation will be the more important activity for 
mobile operators in obtaining higher revenue. So operators should not stick rigidly to the 
need for platform migration but also consider service innovation. Therefore skipping the 
next platform cycle and waiting for the next opportunities of the platform migration might 
be a better decision. The most important issue is how to choose the appropriate scheme, 
taking the current market situation into account. On this question, Figure 6-3 shows the 
logical tree for the decision as to which type of platform migration should be adopted.  
Figure 6-3 Logical Tree for Scheme Decision 
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Three issues should be considered after platform innovation.  
The first point is backward compatibility. This means whether or not the next platform 
technologies have aspects of compatibility with the existing platform. If there is some 
compatibility, mobile operators can choose Evolution-type migration and build their 
migration scenario more easily. In this case, the next point is whether or not the market 
requires the proposed performance capability of next platform. That is, mobile network 
operators should avoid over-performance of the platform and deploy new technologies 
efficiently. If the existing platform provides adequate performance to support profitable 
services and next platform technologies do not offer any new services, mobile operators 
should not accelerate the expansion of new technologies. In this case, Collaboration-type 
migration should be adopted. Naturally, if the new technologies promise to have a great 
impact on the whole market and improve the ARPU decline dramatically, mobile operators 
should not hesitate to deploy these technologies. 
 
Next, in the case that these next platform technologies have no compatibility with their 
existing platform, mobile operators should investigate their technology leadership, value 
chain leadership and investment capability quite carefully, because this discontinuous 
situation is quite difficult to drive. Technology leadership involves two points: the ability to 
create new technical specifications and the ability to manage the migration process from a 
technical perspective. Value chain leadership means whether or not operators can integrate 
their complementary assets, such as content providers and terminals, in an effective manner. 
An associated point is whether or not the market scale is enough large to gives telecom 
vendors economic advantages. Investment capability relates to whether or not mobile 
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operators have enough capital to go ahead with platform migration or not. In particular, 
technology leadership is relatively important, because mobile operators owning R&D 
facilities and profitable services on existing platforms can take on Revolution-type 
migration by considering the 4C framework. Even though they do not have Research 
facilities, some of those that try to organize a strong process management team for checking 
the manufacturing process of vendors and controlling supply schedule will achieve 
successful migration. Mobile operators that cannot carry out these activities should not 
decide to deploy new technologies, but should hold back and focus on service innovation 
for future migration.  
 
In addition, there is another solution for avoiding Revolution-type migration without 
backward compatibility. That is the introduction of multiple-mode handsets, which support 
several wireless interfaces simultaneously. Current technology enhancement has realized 
this concept, but a number of customized specifications for the core network and terminals 
are required. If the market scale of the mobile operator who wants to have these 
sophisticated handsets is not large, its lower attractiveness will prevent handset vendors 
from providing them. Therefore, this case will be limited to the mobile operators that have 
relatively large-scale operations and powerful technology leadership. 
 
6.3.2. Advanced Process Management  
Process management is quite important, when mobile network operators outsource their 
technology investigation and standardization.  
One of the most critical issues in the platform migration process is whether or not mobile 
network operators can acquire their network equipment and complementary assets, 
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particularly terminals, on time. As a result of the recent movement of platform leadership 
from mobile operators to vendors, operators should not stick to reinforce their research 
capabilities but focus on reinforcing process management as shown in Figure 6-4.  
Figure 6-4 Process Management for the Migration Process 
Process management gives mobile operators a number of advantages in the whole 
migration process in the absence of R&D capability, because it allows operators to use 
vendors’ technical performance and reinforce their bargaining powers in the end. In 
addition, they can transfer their technical resources to the innovation of new services and 
support their customers and partners. Figure 6-5 shows an example of process management 
for future platform innovation. A portfolio of multiple vendors reduces the risk of a delayed 
schedule and control of their performance in terms of competition. A trial platform is 
necessary to allow total debugging and an efficient testing process for mobile operators. 
They have to let not only vendors but also their service partners such as content providers 
share this environment for efficient development. 
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Figure 6-5 Development for Process Management 
However, this issue depends on the current level of R&D performance. Some mobile 
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those activities will be quite effective. Therefore these operators owning their own R&D 
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network operators should reinforce their Development function, not for fundamental 
research but for process management. In addition, they should have a portfolio of different 
vendors for the purpose of risk reduction. 
 
6.3.3. More Creativity for the R&D Facility Owner 
This proposal is for only mobile operators that own powerful R&D facilities.  
Mobile network operators have designed the next technologies and proposed them to 
standardization body many times in the past. It is certain that keeping technology leadership 
in standardization is quite important. It is proposed that the key feature of an R&D facility 
for mobile operators is focusing not on productivity but creativity. Even without a 
manufacturing facility, they can protect their technology leadership in terms of IPR. 
Therefore, the proposed focuses for the R&D facilities of mobile operators are basic 
investigation, system design and trial manufacture, in order to create effective IPRs.  
 
However in order to avoid the technological dependence and over-performance, mobile 
network operators need to pursue not only technology enhancement but also profitable 
services in the future. In particular, since the first step of platform migration is technology 
driven, mobile network operators should pursue their own R&D functions for migration. 
 
6.4. Strategies for Service Innovation Dynamics 
6.4.1. Overview for Future Service Innovation Approach 
In the face of future uncertainty, mobile operators should expand this philosophy in order to 
survive in a diversified market. In Chapter 4, the mental breakthrough approach creates 
such service breakthroughs, but mobile operators should not be satisfied with these 
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successes and should pursue new sources of future profitable services.  
 
Fortunately mobile handsets have become a powerful portal for customers with tremendous 
potential to replace other commodity items. For instance, the ability to transmit pictures 
taken by users themselves had led to new types of cell phone equipped with downsized 
digital cameras, which are invading the existing digital camera market. In this way, mobile 
operators are able to accelerate entry into various kinds of markets such as telematics, 
content delivery, health care, m-commerce and so on (Sadeh, 2002). A service portfolio 
composed of these diverse industries reduces the future risk of failure in the service 
innovation and next platform migration. In this respect, this research proposes that mobile 
operators should pursue partnerships with organizations, entrepreneurs and users in the 
targeted industries. 
 
6.4.2. Service Platform Concept 
From an empirical analysis of service innovation dynamics, this research proposes 
enhanced adaptation layers in order to match the diversified markets of the future. Little 
experience with innovative services up to now may force mobile operators to lose not only 
their technological leadership but also future opportunities to become powerful service 
providers.  
For instance, Nokia has already started “Forum Nokia”. This is the supporting function for 
develops and entrepreneurs for reinforcing the complementary applications and use of 
content in Nokia phones. Multimedia Message Service (MMS) will require various kinds of 
content like i-mode, to enhance its attractiveness, because MMS might be provided in terms 
not of Internet content but of internal content provided by operators. Nokia’s strategy for 
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MMS is that terminal vendors will create a new content line-up through their initiatives in 
collaboration with content providers.  
In this respect, mobile operators will lose their own opportunities and will only be able to 
reinforce partnerships with specific vendors for the use of their content and mobile 
terminals. Therefore mobile operators need to evolve their technical, organizational and 
business structure quickly to ensure their future competitive advantages. The concept of a 
service platform will allow them to investigate and improve future profitable services 
flexibly. Mobile operators can expand the concept of an adaptation layer as the “Service 
Platform” as shown inFigure 6-6.  
Figure 6-6 Service Platform for Mobile Network Operators 
The existing platform can be defined as the “Core Platform” for connectivity. The 
adaptation layer has a role in facilitating protocol convergence, but in this concept of a 
service platform, it is opened broadly not only to partner providers but also to the market. 
That is, this platform will also provide toolkits such as software applications adapted to 
each industry. Also, a multiple service platform can be prepared for a portfolio of 
innovative services corresponding to entities of target industries.  
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6.4.3. Service Innovation Model by Partnership Dynamics 
The implication from the i-mode analysis demonstrates for mobile operators the importance 
of partnerships with content providers. Partnerships give mobile operators a host of market 
information, covering the histories, the market segment and customer preferences. 
Therefore mobile operators should investigate organized partnership structures. This 
research proposes a partnership dynamics model featuring corporate initiative, partner 
initiative and market initiative as shown in Figure 6-7.  
 
Corporate Initiative: Mobile operators should take the lead in proposing a series of services 
including prototypes, in order to establish future leadership and knowledge of the market. 
They should develop new toolkits and application matched to the market features in order 
to encourage future partners to provide new services.  
 
Partner Initiative: The second dynamics is partner initiative. Breakthrough of the i-mode 
service was triggered by a full line-up of i-mode content provided by official content 
providers in the first step. The mobile operators might encourage companies and 
organizations to enter the service line-up, with aspects of tangible and intangible support 
being provided by mobile operators. Basically these supports will include technical 
information about platform, toolkits and applications, and know-how for innovating 
services. Additionally partnership can be divided into several grades according to the level 
of support provided. In Figure 6-7, two kinds of partnership are shown. One is a group of 
the secondary partners given fundamental support, and the other is a group of partners 
given premium support including rewards for their contribution to traffic growth. These 
partnerships can be designed according to corporate strategies. 
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Market Initiative: Referring to the Internet market, even users can provide their own 
content to the market by means of simple programming tools. This behavior can be called 
as the “Market Initiative” approach. Sometimes entrepreneurs have appeared from among 
these users and founded new companies offering innovative services. This may be a quite 
significant point for mobile operators in order to survive the future uncertainty. Therefore, 
mobile operators should prepare some tools and modules of network resources and scan the 
behaviors of entrepreneurs in order to lead them into the future partnerships. 
Figure 6-7 Partnership Dynamics Model for Service Innovation 
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6.4.4. Organizational Perspective 
The organizational structure will also need to be changed according to the target industry. 
Mobile operators, first, build new project team internally in order to understand the features 
and segmentation of the newly targeted markets. These new units should develop the 
toolkits and applications to support future partners, while they progress market research. 
This means that this project team has two functions: marketing and development. If they 
are faced with any problems that will have an impact on the core platform technologies, 
they will require new functions from their R&D arms or outsourced manufacturing 
companies. Then they should develop a prototype for trial purposes and to provide 
feedback in order to finalize the innovative service. 
Each department has responsibilities for its own service platform and enhances it based on 
requirements from providers. The mobile operator can encourage its organizations to 
compete internally in providing profitable services in the future.  
 
6.4.5. Business Perspective 
From the business perspective, the service platform will provide a series of toolkits and 
environmental support, which can be called “Premium Support”, to officially partner 
providers. However the most important issue for service breakthrough is how mobile 
operators encourage voluntary providers who are invisible in the gestation phase of the 
service industry, to enter the market and provide new concepts by themselves. Therefore, 
service divisions should provide a minimum set of toolkits that allow voluntary providers to 
check their new service by themselves, while also giving partner providers the full 
treatment. In the end, there is possibility that mobile operators may prepare several levels of 
this premium support based on the contract fees. 
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7. Conclusion 
Historically the mobile industry was driven by technology innovation, and platform 
migration has been observed to be a progression of technology generations, such as 1G, 2G 
and 3G. However the saturation of subscribers and the maturity of voice telephony services 
have forced mobile operators to ask themselves what the mainstream of the mobile 
operators is. This market change indicates that the mainstream of this industry is simply the 
traffic business. Therefore mobile operators need to pursue not only technology innovation 
but also service innovation to ensure traffic increase directly connected to revenue growth. 
 
In this respect, this thesis establishes that the migration process is a reinforcing feedback 
loop composed of two powerful dynamics, namely Platform Migration Dynamics and 
Service Innovation Dynamics.  Since successful migration will allow mobile operators to 
grasp further revenue and a leading position of the market, the migration scenario is an 
important element in corporate strategies in order to sustain their competitive advantages. 
Empirical analyses explain the mechanism of the migration model in more detail. In brief, 
shortage of network capacity causes platform migration dynamics and then successful 
platform migration leads to market growth and market pressure for price reduction. This 
phenomenon results in ARPU decline, and mobile operators are forced to innovate to 
establish new profitable services for traffic growth. In the end, the result of service 
breakthrough gives mobile operators further revenue, while it encourages the next platform 
migration in order to acquire further network capacity. 
 
Platform migration dynamics is an implementation process in new platform technologies 
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and can be categorized into Revolution-type and Evolution-type. Basically if next platform 
technologies have backward compatibility with the existing platform, mobile network 
operators can select the Evolution-type scheme for smooth upgrade of the network capacity 
and function. However recent uncertainty of technology and their loss of technology 
leadership in this industry might sometimes give mobile operators discontinuous situations 
and lead them to choose Revolution-type. In this case, mobile operators should evaluate 
their current level of investment capability, technology leadership and value chain 
leadership carefully and choose whether to opt for Revolution-type migration with 4C 
operation or Skipping of platform migration. Referring to the technology roadmap about 
for Beyond the Third Generation Technology (B3G), mobile operators may have another 
alternative, Collaboration-type migration, which is an enhanced Evolution-type, adapted 
for a technically diversified future situation. Collaboration-type migration allows mobile 
operators to reduce the risk of huge network investment, although they will need to 
carefully investigate a seamless service environment and sophisticated quality control.  
 
Service innovation dynamics is a process for innovating new profitable services for further 
revenue growth and enhancing investment capability for the next platform migration. As 
mentioned above, ARPU decline is the key trigger that forces mobile operators to create 
innovative services. Case analysis of Short Message Service (SMS) and i-mode service 
clarifies that mental breakthrough management is a common approach in the mobile 
industry. However, considering the uncertainty in the future customer preferences, mobile 
operators need to pursue not only “All in mobile” for consumer uses and business uses, but 
also “Mobile in all” for the new traffic sources. In addition, the mixture of corporate 
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initiative, partner initiative and market initiative should be adopted in order to explore the 
new market effectively.  
 
The current two big problems in the mobile industry can be explained in terms of this 
platform migration process. In its struggle with 3G platform migration, NTT DoCoMo is 
just midway through the first step of Revolution-type migration. DoCoMo needs to 
accelerate to completion of service coverage to provide the same level as their PDC 
platform and to improve network quality. Its powerful technology leadership and value 
chain leadership will give DoCoMo a successful result at the end of this bitter trail. The 
second problem is the severe financial situation of European mobile operators owing to the 
extremely costly spectrum auctions. From the viewpoint of the migration model, those 
operators failed to evaluate two key points, namely the level of their investment capabilities 
and the migration cycle between the GPRS platform and the UMTS platform. In particular, 
time-contiguous platform migrations are too expensive for mobile operators. They should 
skip or delay the implementation of 3G platforms until they have gained profitable services, 
which improve their financial condition or wait to see their Multimedia Message Service 
(MMS) breakthrough.  
 
This thesis then proposes the following Migration Strategies for future competitive 
advantages of mobile network operators. First, mobile network operators should drive the 
migration cycle powerfully by concentrating on Successive Service Innovation Dynamics 
for their revenue growth and the next platform migration. The second point is with regard 
to Platform Migration Strategies in which mobile operators should carefully choose from 
134 
three possible migration schemes according to their level of technology leadership, value 
chain leadership and investment capability. Next, they should reinforce their process 
management capability for successful platform migration. Finally, mobile operators should 
enhance the adaptation layer as the Service Platform. Successive service innovation 
requires a portfolio of three types of Partnership Dynamics, that is corporate initiative, 
partner initiative and market initiative. In this respect, mobile operators can provide various 
levels of toolkit applications.  
 
Generally, the creation of the profitable services is quite difficult work. Since the customer 
preferences become more diversified in the future market, mobile operators need to 
harmonize the technology leadership and the partnerships in order to grasp the 
opportunities for the future profitable services. This means that exploring new business 
fields positively, building differentiated business models based on technology resources and 
protecting the property rights are the required tactics. Then the migration led by technology 
innovation and, particularly, sustainable service innovations should be placed as a core 
strategy for mobile operators.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Analysis of Decline in ARPU (Average Revenue Per User) 
 
1. Introduction 
Key issue in this simulation is to clarify the behavior in ARPU under the market saturation 
circumstance. As mentioned in Chapter 2, ARPU is decreasing in the fierce competition 
because of the price reduction. This simulation illustrates this trend from the brief 
quantitative analysis.  
 
2. Source of Decline in ARPU 
Considering the definition of Average Revenue Per User (ARPU), the following three 
subjects have a close influence on ARPU decline. 
l Call charge reduction by fierce competition in the market 
l Customers decrease 
l Minute Of Use (MOU) decrease  
The call charge reduction is the popular reason for ARPU Decline; it heightens the service 
attractiveness, which makes both the number of customers and the MOU grow up. Of 
course, some external factors, namely new substitutes and decline in customer preferences, 
which have a negative impact on the service attractiveness and, finally, ARPU. But in this 
simulation, I don’t take these external factors into account for the simplification. 
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ARPU
Price per Minute
Minute Of Use (MOU)
Monthly Fee
 
Figure A-1 Mechanism of ARPU 
3. Simulation Model 
Figure A-2 illustrates the mechanism of both the customer transfer to the new service and 
ARPU decline. The bottom part of this model explains the simple market transition model 
like S-curve (Sterman, 2000). In this model, the service attractiveness has an influence on 
entry rate and MOU. The source of the call charge reduction comes from the revenue. The 
mobile operators adjust the investment in the reduction, according to the market 
competition. Market competition, in this simulation, means the ratio of the investment in 
the price reduction to the total revenue. Although the actual value of ARPU arises from 
total revenue and the total number of the customers, in this model, it is dependent on the 
MOU, Price per minute and Monthly fee. Then, MOU is defined as the value, which 
increases as the price reduces, because the customers call more frequently in the situation.  
 
4. Environment 
The number of the customers who transfer to the next services is saturated around one year 
later. Initial MOU is 200 minutes/month and is made longer at the reciprocal ratio of the 
call charge reduction. The mobile operator reduces the call charge in each month. The 
initial call charge is 0.2$/minute.  
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Figure A-2 Simulation model for Analysis of ARPU Decline 
5. Implication 
The ARPU decline can be seen in Figure A-3. Even though MOU grows gradually, ARPU 
decreases. This means that price reduction caused by the market pressure in the fierce 
competition is a dominant factor of the ARPU decline. Actually this trend has a severe 
impact on the revenue trend, while the MOU grows after the market saturation as shown in 
Figure A-4 to Figure A-6. Actually the frequent price reductions do not happen. Therefore, 
ARPU decrease more slowly.  
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Figure A-3 ARPU Decline (Investment Ratio = 1% to 3%) 
 
Figure A-4 Price Reduction in Call Charge (Investment Ratio = 1% to 3%) 
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Figure A-5 MOU Growth (Investment Ratio = 1% to 3%) 
 
Figure A-6 Revenue Growth (Investment Ratio = 1% to 3%) 
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The parameters in the simulation 
 
(01) Adoption Fraction=0.05 
 Units: 1 
(02) Adoption from Word of Mouth=Adoption Fraction*Contacts with Adopters 
 Units: customers/month 
(03) ARPU="Minute Of Use (MOU)"*Price per Minute + Monthly Fee 
 Units: dollar/customers/month 
(04) Attractiveness Service=(2*Initial price per minute-Price per Minute)/Initial price per minute 
(05) Competition in the market=0.01 
 Units: **undefined**  
(06) Contact Frequency=10 
 Units: 1/month  
(07) Contacts with Adopters=Probability of Contact with Adopters*Social Contacts 
 Units: customers/month 
(08) Customers= INTEG (Entry Rate, Initial Customers) 
 Units: customers 
(09) Entry Rate=Adoption from Word of Mouth*Attractiveness Service 
 Units: customers/month 
(10) FINAL TIME  = 48 
 Units: month 
(11) Initial Customers=10000 
 Units: customers 
(12) Initial MOU=200 
 Units: minute/month/customers 
(13) Initial price per minute=0.2 
 Units: dollar/minute 
(14) INITIAL TIME  = 0 
 Units: month 
(15) Investment Ratio=Competition in the market 
(16) "Minute Of Use (MOU)"= Initial MOU*Attractiveness Service 
 Units: minute/month/customers 
(17) Monthly Fee=20 
 Units: dollar 
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(18) Potential Customers= INTEG (-Entry Rate, Total Markets Size-Customers) 
 Units: customers 
(19) Price per Minute= INTEG (-Source of price reduction, Initial price per minute) 
Units: dollar/minute 
(20) Probability of Contact with Adopters=Customers/Total Markets Size 
 Units: customers/customers 
(21) Revenue=Customers*ARPU 
 Units: dollar/month 
(22) SAVEPER = TIME STEP 
 Units: month [0,48] 
(23) Social Contacts=Contact Frequency*Potential Customers 
 Units: customers/month  
(24) Source of price reduction=Revenue*Investment Ratio/Customers/"Minute Of Use (MOU)" 
 Units: dollar/month 
(25) TIME STEP  = 0.0625 
 Units: month [0,48] 
(26) Total Markets Size=1e+008 
 Units: customers
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Appendix 2 
The Generations in Mobile Technologies and Specifications 
Source: Essential Guide to Wireless Communications Applications 
 
                                                   
14 Each name before abbreviated is shown in “Terminologies” in the end of this thesis. 
15 GSM has other frequency allocations, namely GSM 450 (450MHz), GSM 900 (900MHz), DCN 
1800 (1.7GHz) and PCS 1900 (1.9GHz). 
 
 System14 Region 
Radio 
Band 
Multiple 
Access 
Data 
Speed 
(max) 
Voice 
Coding 
Compatibility 
NMT Northern 
Europe 
800MHz FDMA - Analog - 
TACS Europe 800MHz FDMA - Analog - 
AMPS North America 800MHz FDMA - Analog - 
1G 
NTT Analog Japan 800MHz FDMA - Analog - 
GSM Europe et al 800MHz15 TDMA 14.4kbps 13kbps GPRS 
D-AMPS 
(IS-54) 
North America 800MHz TDMA 9.6kbps 8kbps AMPS (dual) 
PDC Japan 800MHz TDMA 14.4kbps 11.2kbps/ 
5.6kbps 
PDC-P 
2G 
PCS (cdmaOne) 
(IS-95A) 
North America 
et al. 
800MHz 
1.9GHz 
CDMA 14.4kbps 13kbps IS-95B, 
CDMA2000 1x 
GPRS Europe et al. 800MHz TDMA/ 
Packet 
171.2kbps - GSM 
PDC-P Japan 800MHz TDMA/ 
Packet 
28.8kbps - PDC 
PCS (cdmaOne) 
(IS-95B) 
North America 
et al. 
800MHz 
1.9GHz 
CDMA 
Packet 
64kbps - IS-95A 
CDMA2000 1x 
2.5G 
PCS  
(CDMA2000 1x)  
North America 
et al. 
800MHz 
1.9GHz 
CDMA 144kbps - IS-95A 
IS-95B 
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Terminologies  
 
1G  the First Generation Mobile Technologies 
2G  the Second Generation Mobile Technologies 
3G  the Third Generation Mobile Technologies 
3GPP  The Third Generation Partnership Project 
AMPS  Advanced Mobile Phone Service 
ANSI  American National Standards Institute 
ARPU  Average Revenue Per User 
B-ISUP  Broadband ISUP 
B3G  Technologies Beyond the Third Generation Mobile 
BS  Base Station 
BTS  Radio Base Station 
CA  Complementary Assets 
CDMA  Code Division Multiple Access 
CDPD  Cellular Digital Packet Data 
CN  Core Network 
CODEC  COmpressor DECompressor 
CP  Content Provider 
D-AMPS Digital Advanced Mobile Phone Service 
DS-CDMA Direct Spread CDMA 
EDGE  Enhanced Data GSM Environment 
EIPR  Essential Intellectual Property Right 
ETSI  European Telecommunication Standards Institute 
EV-DO  Evolution Data Only 
EV-DV  Evolution Data Voice 
FCC  Federal Communication Commission 
FDMA  Frequency Division Multiple Access 
FOMA  Freedom Of Mobile multimedia Access 
GPRS  General Packet Radio Service 
GSM  Global Service for Mobile Communications 
GSMA  the GSM Association 
GW  Gateway Server 
IMT-2000 International Mobile Telecommunications 2000 
IP  Internet Protocol 
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IPO  Initial Public Offering 
IPR  Intellectual Property Right 
IS-41  Interim Standard-41 
IS-54  Interim Standard-54 
ISUP  ISDN User Part 
ITU  the International Telecommunication Union 
MC-CDMA Multicarrier CDMA 
MMS  Multimedia Message Service 
MOU  Minutes Of Use 
MP3  MPEG Audio Layer-3 
MPEG  Moving Picture Experts Group  
MS  Mobile Subscriber station 
MSC  Mobile Switching Center 
MSS  Message Storage System 
NMT  Nordic Mobile Telecommunication system 
PCM  Pulse Code Modulation 
PCS  Personal Communication Services 
PDC  Personal Digital Cellular 
PDC-P  Personal Digital Cellular Packet 
PLMN  Public Land Mobile Network 
PSTN  Public Switched Telephone Network 
QoS  Quality of Service 
RAN  Radio Access Network 
RCR  the Research and Development Center for Radio System 
RNC  Radio Network Controller 
SMS  Short Message Service 
TACS  Total Access Communication System 
TDD  Time Division Duplex 
TDMA  Time Division Multiple Access 
UMTS  Universal Mobile Telecommunications System 
VC  Value Chain 
VSELP  Vector Sum Excited Linear Prediction 
W-CDMA Wideband CDMA 
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